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Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview 
 
 Although every culture has its own unique ethical vues, reciprocity, which can be 
defined as the norm of rewarding kind acts (i.e., positive reciprocity) and punishing 
hostile acts (i.e., negative reciprocity), stands as a universally embraced principle in 
virtually all cultures (Fon and Parisi 2005). The principles of “you scratch my back, and 
I’ll scratch yours’’ and “an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth’’ are two prototypical 
examples of reciprocity. Evolutionary biologists and economists argue that humans have 
successfully evolved an innate preference for fairness and reciprocity. In the early 1870s, 
Charles Darwin wrote in his Descent of Men and Selection in Relation to Sex: 
“…as the reasoning powers and foresight…became improved, each man would 
soon learn from experience that if he aided his fellow-men, he would commonly receive 
aid in return. From this low motive he might acquire the habit of aiding his fellows; and 
the habit of performing benevolent actions certainly strengthens the feeling of sympathy, 
which gives the first impulse to benevolent actions. Habits, moreover, followed during 
many generations probably tend to be inherited.” (Darwin 1871) 
The norm of reciprocity is deeply rooted in human nature and it plays an 
important role in nearly all economic or social interactions. Researchers have shown that 
reciprocity has a significant impact on human behavior and performance in a variety of 
traditional contexts, including bargaining (Guth et al. 1982), public good provision (Fehr 
and Gächter 2000), food transfer among civilians (Gurven et al. 2000), and garden labor 
exchange (Hames 1987), among others. With the growth of Internet and Web 2.0 
technologies though, a majority of these social interactions have now moved online. 
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Whereas in traditional offline markets individuals are physically together in time and 
space for simultaneous exchanges, transactions in onli e markets are often characterized 
by asynchronous exchanges between total strangers from geographically dispersed 
locations. Because a vast majority of the interactions in online markets take place 
sequentially and one party endures costs before receiving benefits, there is no guarantee 
that future benefits will be fully delivered by another party. One theoretical solution to 
this uncertainty is formal contracts. However in practice, issues of information 
asymmetry in online markets and the lack of perfect monitoring mechanisms often make 
it costly or even impossible to enforce formal contrac s. In such settings, reciprocity can 
serve as an effective implicit or informal contract (Seinen and Schram 2006).  
In addition, the increased information availability, and the increased transparency 
and visibility of actions and behaviors make it conducive for fostering reciprocity in 
online markets. Since detailed histories of social interactions among participants are often 
publicly available, it requires less effort for an i dividual to recognize and reward 
cooperators and punish defectors. As noted by Pelapret nd Brown (2010), reciprocity is 
one of the fundamental drivers of online behavior in a variety of contexts. For example, 
Wasko and Faraj (2005) show that reciprocity is one f the primary reasons why 
individuals share knowledge with each other in virtual communities, while Wang and 
Wang (2008) show that reciprocity drives players in online games to help each other.   
Given individuals’ strong reliance on reciprocity for online interactions, a good 
understanding of reciprocity-induced consumer behavior in online markets will not only 
help inform the design of online markets, but also pr vide guidelines for policies to 
improve individual interactions. Despite the documented importance of reciprocity in the 
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online context, little is known about how reciprocity actually influences individuals’ 
search and transaction-related behavior in online markets. My dissertation seeks to 
understand how individuals strategically utilize reciprocity and how reciprocity affects 
transaction outcomes and market efficiency in online markets. I propose two essays to 
examine reciprocity in two different online contexts. 
Negative reciprocity is very common in human interactions. Contrary to positive 
reciprocity of which the emphasis is on the return of favors, negative reciprocity 
emphasizes on the return of injuries (Eisenberger et al. 2004; Friedman and Singh 2004; 
Helm et al. 1972). There is considerable evidence that humans take revenge in response 
to hostile acts even when it is costly. Some researchers argue that humans are disposed to 
give a greater role to negative reciprocity than to positive reciprocity (Friedman et al. 
2004). The first essay in my dissertation examines negative reciprocity in online auction 
markets. To overcome the information asymmetry problem in online transactions, 
reputation systems have been widely implemented to communicate product/seller quality 
and foster trust among buyers and sellers by allowing them to share their opinions and 
experiences with other members. Typically a reputation system works as follows: after a 
transaction, both parties can rate the other party’s performance; each participant has some 
publicly visible reputation metrics such as the running total of rating points received from 
other participants and the percentage of positive ratings. Although the goal of a reputation 
system is to elicit honest reports and ratings, its two-way nature opens the door for 
gaming through negative reciprocity: one party who receives a negative feedback can 
strategically reply with a negative feedback regardless of her actual performance in order 
to force the other party who cares about her reputation to mutually withdraw the negative 
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ratings. My first essay examines this form of negative reciprocity which is called 
revoking and tries to answer two related questions: (1) do participants engage in negative 
reciprocity and how does it affect the effectiveness of the reputation system? (2) Do 
participants change their behavior if the potential for negative reciprocity is eliminated? 
Taking advantage of an exogenous change in eBay’s reputation system design, the 
findings from the essay provide evidence that certain sellers in online markets utilize 
negative reciprocity to revoke the bad ratings they received, thus making the reputation 
mechanism less effective in distinguishing sellers of different qualities. I further find that 
sellers who engaged in negative reciprocity earlier s gnificantly improve the quality of 
their transactions after negative reciprocity is made impossible.  I discuss the implication 
of these findings for the design of reputation mechanisms in online markets. 
The second essay examines positive reciprocity in the emerging online barter 
markets. Unlike transactions in money-based markets, barter transactions by definition 
are the exchanges of goods or services without using money and therefore are conducted 
under the norm of reciprocity. Because barter markets often specialize in a particular type 
of good, market participants typically share similar long-term interests in those goods and 
repetitive interactions are encouraged. Another significant difference between traditional 
money-based online markets and online barter markets is that, while the former is often 
characterized by one-shot interactions (Resnick and Zeckhauser 2002), the latter allows 
the potential for developing lasting reciprocal relationships among participants. Using a 
unique dataset from a leading barter market for books, I seek to understand the 
differential impacts of reciprocity-related search strategies on transaction outcomes as 
well as how individuals can be segmented into different search strategies. Specifically, I 
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first use clustering techniques to unveil the predominant search strategies in the market. I 
find that there are three major search strategies us d by the market participants: indirect 
reciprocity, immediate reciprocity, and delayed reciprocity. I next demonstrate that they 
have differential influences on transaction outcomes: whereas immediate reciprocity 
search strategy helps improve the service quality of the current transaction by 
encouraging faster delivery speed from the transaction partner, delayed reciprocity search 
strategy produces better match with an individual’s ctual transaction needs. I further find 
that individuals can be segmented into the different s arch strategy clusters based on their 
book avidness, breadth of interest, and psychographic profiles (rather than demographic 
profiles). The results provide guidance for barter market makes to segment the market 
participants.  
Together the findings from my dissertation will help build a better understanding 
of how the norm of reciprocity affects individual behavior and transaction outcomes in 
various online markets and its implications for online market design. The following 




Chapter 2: Strategic Behavior in Online Reputation Systems: 




Reputation systems play a critical role in electronic markets due to significant 
information asymmetry between sellers and buyers (Ba and Pavlou 2002; Dellarocas 
2003). A wide variety of reputation systems have ben designed and implemented to 
mitigate problems arising from information asymmetry, with eBay’s feedback 
mechanism being the most established and well-studied among them. Given the 
importance of reputation systems for online markets, it is not surprising that both 
practitioners and academic researchers have invested substantial efforts in examining the 
design of online reputation and feedback mechanisms as evidenced by the growing 
number of studies in recent years (e.g., Aperjis and Johari 2010; Bolton et al. 2004; 
Cabral and Hortacsu 2010; Dellarocas et al. 2006; Melnik and Alm 2002; Resnick et al. 
2006; Resnick and Zeckhauser 2002). The importance of such feedback and ratings for 
transaction partners has been well documented, and prior studies have shown that a 
seller’s reputation score has a significant impact on sales and price premiums (e.g., 
Houser and Wooders 2006; Resnick et al. 2006). 
Clearly, the effectiveness of a reputation system critically depends on the 
behavior of the transacting partners (Dini and Spagnolo 2005). Given the importance of 
reputation, it is not surprising that opportunistic sellers try to “game” the system to boost 
their reputation scores. It has been inferred that a substantial percentage of buyers would 
rather remain silent than provide negative ratings to a seller due to fear of retaliation. 
Therefore, one critical mission for reputation system design is to promote desirable seller 
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behavior. Up to this point, however, there have been f w studies examining how sellers 
respond to changes in reputation system design. My study represents an effort to fill this 
gap in the literature. In particular, I focus on one strategic behavior within eBay’s 
reputation mechanism – the revoking of negative buyer feedback. Before May 19, 2008, 
eBay allowed “revoking” – the ability to withdraw negative feedback subsequent to 
mutual agreement by the buyer and seller. While the ability to revoke negative feedback 
enables transacting partners to correct honest mistake , it is also prone to abuse by 
strategic sellers. Specifically after receiving a negative rating from a buyer, the seller 
could retaliate by giving a negative rating to the buyer, and then suggest that both 
transaction partners withdraw their negative ratings. Since negative ratings are very rare 
(typically less than 1% of total ratings) and carry significantly more weight than positive 
ratings (Standifird 2001; Resnick and Zeckhauser 2002), such negative reciprocity-based 
revocations can be especially damaging to an online reputation system. 
Starting in May of 2008, eBay banned the withdrawal of negative feedback, and 
disallowed sellers from leaving neutral and negative feedback for buyers – in essence 
eliminating the possibility of retaliation and revocation by opportunistic sellers. This 
policy change, the biggest in eBay’s history, provides a “natural experiment” setting that 
allows me to infer the causal effect of reputation system design on seller behavior with 
greater confidence. 
My study seeks to empirically examine how strategic sellers respond to this policy 
change in two periods: at the time of announcement, a d in the post-implementation 
period. First, shortly after the announcement of the policy change, there was a week-long 
strike by some sellers. This provides a test-bed of sellers’ reactions to the changes to 
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reputation system. I would expect, especially given that this policy aims to curb the 
strategic seller behavior, that those opportunistic ellers who benefit from gaming the 
system would react more strongly to a ban on such revoking. Second, I analyze the 
changes in seller feedback after the implementation of the new policy by comparing it to 
feedback generated in the pre-change period. Using a “difference-in-differences” 
approach, I seek to infer the reactions of strategic sellers compared to other sellers.  
This study makes several important contributions to the literature on reputation 
systems. To the best of my knowledge, there have been f w studies on the explicit 
strategic behavior of sellers in the context of online reputation systems. Previous studies 
(e.g.: Dellarocas and Wood 2008) have inferred the thr at of retaliation using statistical 
models. I build on these studies, and obtain direct and detailed measures of retaliation and 
revoking behavior, which allow us to obtain deeper insights into the operational details of 
the gaming behavior within a reputation system.  Second, I advance the existing literature 
that reputation matters in eBay auctions (Dewan and Hsu 2004, Lucking-Reiley et al. 
2007) by providing one of the first empirical evidenc  of seller reactions to changes in 
reputation mechanism design.  Empirically, the natural experiment setting, as well as the 
use of a difference-in-differences approach, allows us to infer the causal effect more 
rigorously.  
Theoretically, this study also provides important isights into the theory 
development of online reputation systems (Dellarocas 2005). In recent years, theoretical 
work on the design of reputation system has highlighted the significance of modeling 
how sellers respond to reputation mechanism design.  There are three different ways to 
model a reputation system in a market wherein long-lived sellers interact with short-lived 
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buyers: pure hidden information, pure hidden action, and mixed model (Barr-Issac and 
Tadelis 2008). In the pure hidden information model, s llers vary in their innate ability 
(or “type”) to deliver a product/service, and the reputation system’s goal is to reveal the 
seller’s type (Cripps et al. 2004; Mailath and Samuelson 2006). On the other hand, the 
pure hidden action model assumes that sellers have control over the outcome of a 
transaction by deciding how much effort to put into it. In such a case the reputation 
system is designed to motivate the effort the seller exerts (Dellarocas 2005; Fan et al. 
2005). The mixed model assumes that sellers differ in their innate abilities or qualities, 
but low quality sellers can increase the probability of a satisfactory transaction by 
exerting more effort (Aperjis and Johari 2010; Cabral and Hortacsu 2010; Li 2010).  
While various theoretical papers have adopted different models of reputation systems, 
there is little empirical evidence to verify these competing assumptions. My study 
examines the extent to which sellers change their behavior with the reputation system 
design, and generates valuable insights on the crucial behavioral assumption in these 
models. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in the next section, I provide an 
overview of existing literature; section 2.3 focuses on the analysis of seller reactions to 
the announcement of the policy change; section 2.4 examines the seller’s response to the 
changes in the reputation mechanism design (i.e., th  elimination of revoking); and 
section 2.5 concludes the paper. 





2.2.1 Online Reputation System 
 
In online exchange markets like eBay sellers and buyers are often geographically 
separated. The buyer has few means to verify the quality of the seller or hold the seller 
responsible. This potential of seller opportunism is even more significant when buyers 
and sellers have infrequent interactions. Reputation systems, which disseminate 
information and past behavior of individual traders, are designed to facilitate trustworthy 
transactions among strangers on the Internet. Numerous online markets, such as 
Elance.com, vWorker.com, Amazon.com, and eBay have adopted reputation mechanisms 
to promote honesty and better efforts in traders’ behavior.  
Whereas an increasing number of studies have focused on designing different 
reputation mechanisms (e.g., Maslet and Penard 2012; You and Sikora 2011), eBay’s 
reputation mechanism is arguably the most established and the most scrutinized by the 
popular press as well as by academics. On eBay, the primary source of information about 
the trustworthiness of a seller is his/her feedback profile. Upon the completion of a 
transaction, both buyers and sellers have the opportunity to leave feedback within 90 
days. Resnick and Zeckhauser (2002) find that buyers leave feedback 52.1% of the time 
and sellers leave feedback 60.6% of the time. 
The feedback has three levels of valence: positive, neutral, and negative. In 
addition, buyers and sellers can each provide detailed comments about the other party 
regarding the transaction. The feedback a seller or a buyer receives is aggregated with 
previous feedback to calculate his/her feedback score, which is one key metric indicating 
the user’s reputation. A user’s reputation score is calculated as the count of distinct users 
who gave positive feedback minus the count of those who left negative feedback, and it is 
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displayed right next to the user’s ID wherever it appears on eBay. In addition, the 
percentage of positive feedback amongst all distinct positive and negative ratings for each 
seller is also reported. Since examining each indivdual feedback comment would entail a 
huge investment of time by the buyer, the reputation score, together with the percentage 
of positive feedback, is displayed to signal a seller’s quality. Given the importance of the 
feedback a user receives, eBay allowed buyers and sellers to negotiate to mutually revoke 
negative feedback ratings while unilateral attempts are disallowed. This policy has 
remained in place since eBay was founded in 1995, until the 2008 policy change that 
disallowed revoking.  
Despite eBay’s popularity and success, there has been evidence of inefficiencies 
in its reputation mechanism. Some sellers continue to peddle fraudulent items with 
misleading descriptions without being caught. For instance, it is estimated that over 70% 
of the Tiffany jewels sold on eBay are fakes (Hafner 2007). Furthermore, one would 
expect an effective reputation mechanism to reward good sellers. However researchers 
have failed to find consistent evidence for the impact of a seller’s reputation on auction 
price. Resnick et al. (2006), for example, find that negative feedback seems to have no 
impact on buyers’ willingness-to-pay. Cabral and Hortacsu (2010) examine sales of 
laptops, coins, and beanie babies on eBay and find that neither positive nor negative 
feedback influences the final auction price. Melnik and Alm (2002) find that even when a 
seller doubles his ratings, the consumer’s willingness-to-pay for gold coin increases by 
only 18 cents. Similarly, Lucking-Reiley et al. (2007) find that positive ratings have a 
negligible impact on price. This is echoed by Eaton (2005) who finds that a seller’s 
reputation has little or no impact on the actual bid prices.  
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One critical issue that is detrimental to eBay’s reputation system is seller strategic 
behavior relating to feedback. On eBay, sellers andbuyers may independently leave 
feedback within 90 days of the transaction and the feedback is available immediately to 
the other party. While the system is symmetric (two-way), allowing both buyers and 
sellers to rate each other, buyers are at a disadvantage because buyers face product 
uncertainty before payment and seller opportunism after payment. While the reputation 
system intends to facilitate buyers’ reporting of dishonest sellers to warn others, the 
symmetric nature of the previous reputation system makes it convenient and nearly 
costless for sellers to retaliate against any buyer providing them a negative rating. Thus it 
was apt to say that for buyers, “a negative first feedback can never be given without the 
fear of retaliation” (Klein et al. 2009). This fear of retaliation reduces a buyer’s 
propensity to leave negative feedback on the seller (D llarocas and Wood 2008). As a 
result, this creates an incentive for one party to strategically withhold its feedback as a 
means of retaliation (Dellarocas and Wood 2008; Yamagishi and Matsuda 2002). In 
addition to these direct feedback retaliation, a seller can also threaten to report buyers as 
scammers or abusers of the feedback system as a way to discourage negative feedback. 
This happens through private messaging and is not directly observable. 
Once a buyer leaves a negative rating, the seller can retaliate and then try to “fix” 
the feedback using eBay’s revoking policy (Bolton et al 2009; Klein et al. 2009). In the 
vast majority of cases, revoking (the withdrawal of feedback based on mutual agreement) 
is preceded by a reciprocal negative feedback. When a seller responds to a negative rating 
with a negative rating, about 27% are later withdrawn through the revoking mechanism 
(Bolton et al. 2009).  
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In summary, the ability to retaliate and revoke feedback creates an incentive for 
opportunistic sellers to manipulate their reputations by nullifying negative feedback. 
Whereas Bolton et al. (2009) and Klein et al. (2009) have pointed out the possibility of 
such strategic revoking, no study has thus far empirically and systematically examined 
this phenomenon. 
2.2.2 eBay’s Policy Change: Put An End to Seller Coercion 
 
Given the potential problems of eBay’s reputation system, scholars have suggested 
different ways to enhance the design of reputation systems. In a theoretical analysis, Ba et 
al. (2003) suggest that digital certificates issued by a trusted third party can motivate 
market participants to behave honestly. Others havealso proposed that eBay should allow 
only the buyer to rate the seller (Chwelos and Dhar 2006) or that eBay should 
simultaneously reveal both partners’ ratings (Reichling 2004). Eventually in January 
2008, eBay announced dramatic changes to its reputation mechanism. Starting on May 
19, 2008, sellers were no longer allowed to provide negative or neutral feedback to 
buyers. A seller now has only two choices: not leaving any feedback, or leaving a 
positive one to the buyer. Furthermore, revocation or mutual withdrawal of the feedback 
was disallowed. Any feedback that is left cannot be removed unless it is investigated and 
determined as a violation or abuse of eBay’s feedback policy after a dispute is filed. Bill 
Cobb, CEO of eBay, made the following comments in his public announcement on the 
reputation mechanism changes: 
“… the original intent of eBay's public feedback system was to provide an honest, 
accurate record of member experiences. ……  But overall, the current feedback system 
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isn't where it should be. Today, the biggest issue with the system is that buyers are more 
afraid than ever to leave honest, accurate feedback e ause of the threat of retaliation. In 
fact, when buyers have a bad experience on eBay, the final straw for many of them is 
getting a negative feedback, especially of a retalia ory nature. Now, we realize that 
feedback has been a two-way street, but our data show  a disturbing trend, which is that 
sellers leave retaliatory feedback eight times more frequently than buyers do ... and this 
figure is up dramatically from only a few years ago. S  we have to put a stop to this and 
put trust back into the system.” (eBay 2008) 
This change – from a symmetric to an asymmetric feedback system - removed a 
seller’s ability to retaliate against a buyer providing negative feedback. This change 
serves as an exogenous event that enables us to investigate how sellers respond to the 
changes in the design of eBay’s reputation system. After the change in the reputation 
system, since buyers are shielded from retaliation fr m the sellers, they should be more 
willing to express their negative opinions toward sellers. Since the policy change mostly 
affects strategic sellers who have used retaliation and revoking to “fix” their reputations, 
these sellers should be the most affected by the new policy. If these sellers continue to 
under-perform, they could easily attract more negative feedback than other sellers under 
the new (changed) reputation mechanism.  Therefore this policy change offers a valuable 
opportunity to examine how strategic sellers respond t  reputation system design, which I 






eBay’s radical overhaul of its reputation mechanism, described above to be effective on 
May 2008, was announced on January 30, 2008. The announcement caused outrage 
amongst some sellers and culminated in a week-long strike, from February 18 to 
February 25, 2008, to protest the changes (Zouhali-Worrall 2008). To allow enough time 
for the new reputation mechanism to take effect, I define a 3-month period – July 1, 2008 
to September 30, 2008 – as the post-change period1.   Correspondingly, I define July 1, 
2007 to September 30, 2007 as the pre-change period fo  two reasons. First, the pre- and 
post- periods cover the same months of a year, which alleviates potential seasonal effects 
on seller behavior. Second, because the pre-change period ends four months before 
eBay’s announcement, it is unlikely that buyers andsellers had changed their behavior in 
anticipation of the policy change. Comparing the pr- and post- periods allows us to 
examine the impact of the change in the reputation system design on buyer and seller 
behaviors. Figure 2.1 shows the timeline of the events. 
I draw a random sample of 28902 sellers from the eBay marketplace (which I refer 
to as “general sellers”). To control for product categories, the sampling is stratified based 
on the distribution of product categories on eBay. As I argue, there are sellers who 
strategically exploit the revoking policy to manage th ir displayed reputations. If this 
were the case, then I would expect these sellers to respond most strongly to the 
                                                        
1 eBay instituted some other change later on in October, 2008. For example, eBay stopped allowing users to 
send checks or money orders as payment for items purchased on the US version of the site after October 20 
2008. Buyers would only be able to pay using PayPal, roPay, credit or debit cards (if the seller has an 
internet merchant account), or pay for the item upon ickup. These changes are beyond this study period, 
and thus they should not interfere with the effect of feedback policy change on seller behavior in this study. 
2 I restrict this sample to well-established sellers with total lifetime feedback of 500 or more at theime of 
data collection in the year 2008. This reduces the noise from casual sellers and allows for a more accurate 
measurement of seller behavior based on transaction volume. These sellers account for 69.98% of all active 
listings on eBay at the time of this data collection. 
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announcement of a ban on revoking. Therefore, examining the participation of strike 
provides an opportunity to test strategic sellers’ reaction to the change in the reputation 
system design.  
I use eBay’s seller central forum to identify the sellers who participated in the 
strike. This forum is an online space for sellers to discuss a variety of issues related to 
eBay sellers, and it was established several years before the strike. Following the 
announcement of the policy change in January 2008, a thread on eBay's seller central 
forum was created with the title “Sign the pledge: No sales Feb 18-25!” From this thread 
I identify 398 unique IDs of sellers who signed thepl dge, which I refer to as “strikers”.  
Since the strike was initiated in the eBay forum, one may argue that sellers active 
in the forum were more likely to strike merely because they knew about it. To control for 
this potential confounding factor and ensure the robustness of the results, I introduce a 
second control group: forum sellers who were active in the forum but did not participate 
in the strike. I create a random sample of 2280 such sellers (which I refer to as “forum 
sellers”). 
To confirm that the sellers who pledged in the strike thread were actually 
participating in the strike, I check their listing activities during the strike week. I do find 
that strikers reduced their listings very significantly during the one-week period whereas I 
observe no such trend for general sellers and forum sellers.  
For all the sellers I collect two sets of data: sellers’ feedback history and sellers’ 
listing records. The data covers all listings (including sold and unsold items) for the years 
2007-2008, as well as the feedback if received. Based on sellers’ feedback history data, I 
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calculate each seller’s profiles, including their reputation scores and specific types of 
feedback ratings, which are dynamically updated at the time of each listing. 
2.4 Data Analyses 
2.4.2 Are Revokers More Likely to Be Strikers? 
 
I first analyze the percentage of revoked feedback during the pre-change period for the 
three groups in Table 2.1.Idifferentiate between the cases of seller retaliated and revoked 
(SRR), buyer retaliated and revoked (BRR), and non-retaliated and revoked (NRR). SRR 
feedback refers to the situation wherein the buyer leaves the seller a negative rating 
followed by the seller retaliating with a negative rating, and then both parties mutually 
agreeing to revoke their negative feedback. BRR feedback refers to the situation wherein 
the seller leaves the buyer a negative rating followed by the buyer retaliating with a 
negative rating, and then both parties mutually withdrawing negative feedback. NRR 
feedback refers to the situation wherein the buyer gives the seller a negative rating and 
the seller directly asks for a withdrawal without any retaliation.  
On average, strikers have 0.028% BRR feedback and 0.021% NRR feedback; 
general sellers have 0.015% BRR feedback and 0.043% NRR feedback; and forum sellers 
have 0.022% BRR feedback and 0.028% NRR feedback. The differences between 
strikers and other two types of sellers in terms of BRR and BRR feedback are not 
statistically significant. However, strikers do have a significantly higher SRR feedback 
percentage (0.445%) than general sellers (0.058%) and forum sellers (0.056%). To 
summarize the findings so far, the main difference between strikers and the two other 
categories of sellers is the frequency of SRR feedback. This indicates that strikers have 
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engaged in significantly more retaliation and revoking: they strategically retaliated 
against buyers by providing them negative feedback after receiving negative feedback 
and then negotiated with buyers to mutually revoke the negative feedback.  
The occurrence of the strike seems to suggest that sellers cared about changes to 
eBay’s reputation mechanism. However, there are other factors that might drive 
participation in the strike. Specifically, at the same time eBay announced changes to its 
fee structure: lower listings fees (the price charged for each item listed to be sold on 
eBay) and higher final value fees (a percentage of the closing price extracted by eBay). 
Based on their listing and sales patterns, some eBay sellers believed that they would have 
to pay more because of these changes. Thus, potential fi ancial loss under the new fee 
structure could have also motivated some sellers to join the strike.  
To control for the potential impact of changes in the fee structure, I collect 
detailed listings of sellers in all three groups one month prior to the strike (from January 
18, 2008 to February 17, 2008).I collect detailed information about each listing, including 
product category, auction style, starting price, final price, and usage of features such as 
gallery pictures and subtitles. This allows us to calculate the exact fee charged by eBay. 
To measure potential financial loss, I calculate, for each listing, the difference between 
fees actually charged by eBay under the old fee structu e and fees that would be charged 
by eBay under the new fee structure. I then aggregate the differences at the seller level. 
In addition to changes to the fee structure, several other factors could potentially 
influence participation in the strike as well. Sellers with a larger number of listings 
(logarithmized) would suffer more financially if they joined the strike and hence may 
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have been less likely to participate. Powersellers3 would also be less likely to join the 
strike because they would enjoy significant final vue fee discounts under the new fee 
structure. The longer a seller has used eBay, the higher his/her switching cost due to the 
accumulated loyal customer base on eBay. These sellers should care more about the long-
term interest and thus have a stronger reaction to the reduction of seller power under the 
new reputation mechanism. Therefore I include number of months on eBay as another 
control variable. Seller reputation is measured by both reputation score (log-transformed) 
and total negative feedback percentage (i.e., the sum of revoked negative feedback 
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The descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of the variables in the regression 
are provided in Tables 2.2 and 2.3. The maximum VIF is 1.59, well below the threshold 
of 10, indicating that there is no multicollinearity among the independent variables.  
The results of the logit regression model are shown in Table 2.4. Model 1 is the 
baseline model. The coefficient of fee difference is significantly positive, suggesting that 
sellers who stand to lose more (or save less) under the new fee structure are more likely 
to strike. Consistent with my prediction, sellers with a longer tenure on eBay are more 
likely to strike. Powerseller status and the volume of listings do not have a significant 
effect on a seller’s propensity to strike. 
                                                        
3 A Powerseller is an eBay seller who participates in the Powersellers program and maintains a high quality 
feedback profile and constant or growing trading volume. Powersellers enjoy a closer trading relationship 
with eBay, including increased attention, specialized tools, and discounts on final value fees. 
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The coefficient of total negative feedback percentage is significantly positive, 
suggesting that sellers with more negative feedback before revoking are more likely to 
strike. In Model 2, I divide total negative feedback percentage into remained negative 
feedback percentage and revoked feedback percentage i  th  regression. I find that the 
pseudo R2 increases by almost 160%, supporting the ass rtion that a seller’s revoking 
behavior has significant explanatory power on his/her participation in the strike. The 
coefficient of the percentage of revoked feedback is positive and is significant at the 
p<0.001 level. This suggests that sellers with a history of revoking negative feedback are 
more likely to strike. In Model 3, I split revoked feedback into SRR feedback, BRR 
feedback, and NRR feedback. The Pseudo R2 further increases by about 100%. The 
coefficient of SRR feedback percentage is significant and positive, but the coefficients of 
BRR feedback percentage and NRR feedback percentage are insignificant. This indicates 
that the sellers who strategically retaliate and then revoke negative feedback are indeed 
more likely to strike. A 0.1% increase in SRR feedback percentage would lead to 18.07 
percent increase in the odds of joining the strike. 
The reputation profile comparison in the pre-change period and the logit 
regression analyses on the strike both provide empirical evidence that revoking after 
retaliation is a significant factor that motivates the participation in the one-week strike. 
This prompts us to examine the change on seller behavior after the implementation of the 
new policy, as detailed in Section 4.2. 




In this section, I focus on the impact of reputation system change on strategic 
sellers. To increase generalizability, I identify strategic sellers from the random sample of 
2890 general sellers4. 
2.4.2.1 The Effect of Revoking on Seller Reputation 
 
Before examining how the policy change affects strategic sellers’ behavior, it is 
instrumental to assess the extent of the benefit these sellers derive from revoking. If 
revoking plays a major role in affecting these sellers’ reputations, then it is more 
reasonable to assume that disallowing revoking should affect seller behavior in a 
substantial way. Therefore, I examine (1) how much revoking contributes to boosting the 
displayed reputation scores of revokers; and (2) how revokers’ displayed and real 
reputation scores compare to the reputation of other non-revoking sellers.  
Because only SRR feedback reflects sellers’ strategic r taliation behavior, I define 
“revokers” as sellers who had SRR feedback in the pre-change period (before the 
announcement of the policy change). “Non-revokers” a e sellers with zero SRR feedback 
(but they may have a small proportion of BRR or NRR feedback). This results in a 
sample of 221 revokers and 2669 non-revokers. Becaus  SRR feedback is relatively rare, 
observing a higher percentage of SRR feedback for revokers requires that they have a 
significantly higher number of feedback ratings than non-revokers. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that the average reputation score for revok rs (815.25) is higher than that of 
the non-revokers (156.66). This result is also consistent with the findings of Wood et al. 
                                                        
4 I also conduct analysis using the strikers as the convenient sample of strategic sellers, and the rest of 
sellers as control group, and get similar findings. 
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(2002), which show that sellers with high reputation scores are more likely to engage in 
opportunistic behavior because buyers have a higher tolerance for them.  
To confirm that My  findings are not driven by the difference in the number of 
feedback ratings, I use the propensity score matching method to correct for potential 
sample selection bias due to the observable differences (Dehejia and Wahba 2002). I first 
predict propensity score based on a logit regression of the treatment (i.e., the status of 
revoker) on several key covariates, including the seller’s reputation score, the seller’s 
tenure on eBay, the seller’s Powerseller status, and the average product price of the 
seller’s listings. Then, for each revoker in the tra ment group, I identify a matching 
seller in the control group (i.e., non-revokers) using nearest neighbor matching on the 
propensity score. Common support condition is imposed so that the treatment 
observations whose propensity scores are higher than t e maximum or less than the 
minimum propensity score of the controls are dropped. This results in 198 revokers and 
198 non-revokers.  
On eBay, a seller’s displayed reputation is reflected in his/her reputation score 
and in the percentage of positive feedback. Reputation score is defined as the number of 
unique positive feedback subtracted by the number of unique negative feedback5.  The 
displayed percentage of positive feedback for a given seller is calculated by dividing the 
number of unique positive ratings by the total number of unique positive ratings and 
unique negative ratings. Once a feedback is revoked, it is not included in the calculation 
of reputation score and percentage of positive feedback. Therefore the displayed 
                                                        
5 Consistent with eBay’s approach to calculate reputations, I only consider unique feedback: multiple 
positive feedback ratings from the same buyer are counted as only one positive feedback rating. Other types 
of feedback ratings are treated similarly. 
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reputation is subject to gaming. I further calculate  seller’s “true reputation” by taking 
into account neutral and revoked feedback.  
Table 2.5 provides the comparison of both displayed r putation and true 
reputation profiles for revokers and non-revokers. For the displayed reputation, the 
average percentage of positive feedback for revokers and non-revokers is 99.42% and 
99.56%, respectively. The difference is not significant at the 5% level, suggesting that the 
displayed reputation is similar between revokers and non-revokers.  
I next compare the true reputations of revokers and non-revokers. Note that the 
revoked feedback was originally a negative feedback that had been withdrawn upon the 
mutual agreement of both the seller and the buyer. After adding in the original negative 
value of revoked feedback, I find that revokers actu lly have a much higher true negative 
feedback percentage than non-revokers (0.92%+0.57%=1.49% for revokers, and 
0.06%+0.41%=0.47% for non-revokers, t-value=15.28, p<0.001). Combined with the 
comparison of the displayed reputations, the results indicate that while revokers have a 
much higher percentage of true negative feedback, the revoking mechanism helps these 
lower-reputation sellers masquerade as sellers withhig er reputations. Therefore, one 
would expect that a ban on revoking should either help reveal the true reputation of these 
strategic sellers, or trigger behavioral change among these sellers – issues which I 
examine in-depth in the following sections. 
2.4.2.2 Difference-in-Differences Analysis 
 
To measure the impact of the 2008 policy change on seller behavior, I adopt a difference-
in-differences model, which is commonly used to examine the causal effect of an 
intervention. One major advantage of the difference-i -differences model is that it 
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circumvents many of the endogeneity issues that canarise when comparing 
heterogeneous individuals (Meyer 1995; Bertrand et al. 2004).  
Denote ∆r as the change in a revoker’s propensity to receive negative feedback 
from buyers after the new policy, and ∆n as that of non-revokers. Some unobserved 
factors can contribute to the change in seller reputation scores (e.g., changes in eBay’s 
buyer population, competition from other market places, etc). However, since these 
factors are common to both the revokers and non-revokers, I can difference out their 
effects, and identify the extra impact of policy change on revokers by ∆r - ∆n (that is, 
beyond the impact received by non-revokers). 
I delve deeper to identify these impacts. In my case, two major factors contribute 
to the change in feedback by buyers. First, because of the removal of seller retaliation, 
buyers are more likely to leave negative feedback, which I term as δb. Second, with less 
power in the reputation system, sellers are now likely to improve their efforts in servicing 
buyers, which could also lead to a reduction of negative feedback. I term this effect as δ . 
For revokers, the change in the propensity of receiving negative feedback from buyers, 
∆r, can be expressed as: 
∆r = δbr +δsr, where r denotes revokers. 
Similarly, the change for non-revokers can be expressed as: 
∆n = δbn +δsn, where n denotes non-revokers. 
The difference-in-differences in the propensity of receiving negative feedback 
between revokers and non-revokers is: 
 ∆r - ∆n = (δbr +δsr) - (δbn +δsn)  
 = (δbr - δbn) + (δsr - δsn) 
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Therefore, I have (δsr - δsn) = (∆r - ∆n) - (δbr - δbn) 
In the above equation, δsr - δsn reflects the extra effort exerted by a revoker to 
improve his/her behavior (which might be in the form of a more accurate description of 
items, faster delivery, better packaging, among other means), which leads to the reduction 
in negative ratings. A negative δsr - δsn implies that revokers exert more efforts to reduce 
negative ratings from buyers in the post-change period. 
Controlling for Buyer Behavior Change: δbr - δbn reflects the difference across 
revokers and non-revokers over the buyer’s propensity to leave them negative feedback 
when holding seller service quality constant. Since the displayed reputation profiles of 
revokers and non-revokers are very similar, as I found in Section 2.4.2.1, I should not 
expect the buyers of revokers to be systematically different from buyers of non-revokers. 
Indeed I find that both revokers and non-revokers face similar groups of buyers. As 
shown in Table 2.6, the buyers of revokers are not statistically different from buyers of 
non-revokers in terms of how long they have been on eBay and their reputation scores 
both before the policy change and after the policy change. Furthermore, buyers of the 
revokers group and buyers of the non-revokers group have a similar propensity to leave 
negative feedback to sellers. Therefore, the difference-in-differences term, ∆r - ∆n, 
provides a good proxy for δsr - δsn, the additional efforts by revokers compared to non-
revokers6.   
I estimate the following specification:  
                                                        
6 Still, one might argue that buyers of revokers respond differently to the policy change than buyers of n n-
revokers. If this were the case, then δsr should be greater than δsn, given the historical higher retaliation rate 
of revokers. Since (δsr - δsn) = (∆r - ∆n) - (δbr - δbn), this means that (∆r - ∆n) is underestimating (δsr - δsn). 
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where i indexes the sellers and t indexes the feedback. The dependent variable, 
ifNegativeit, is a dummy that equals 1 if the feedback received by the seller is negative
7.  
Pt is a dummy variable indicating whether the time of the feedback is within the pre-
change period or the post-change period (Pt=1). The coefficient of Pt reflects the general 
change in the possibility of receiving negative feedback by sellers. Gi is a dummy 
variable indicating whether the seller is a revoker (Gi=1) or not. As discussed above, the 
coefficient of Pt*G i captures δsr - δsn. I also include the month_dummyt variables to 
control for possible time fixed effects. Finally, three control variables are added to 
control for transaction heterogeneity: duration of the transaction, final price, and the 
seller’s tenure at the time of transaction. As detailed in Section 2.4.1, the pre-change 
period is defined as July-September 2007, and the post-change period is July-September 
2008. 
2.4.2.3 Empirical Findings 
 
For the 198 revokers and 198 non-revokers, I collect 240,990 feedback ratings in the pre-
change period and 215,802 feedback ratings in the post-change period. 
The estimates are reported in Table 2.7. In the random effects logit model, the 
coefficient of Pt is significantly positive, indicating that sellers generally are more likely 
to receive negative feedback after the change in the reputation system. This is consistent 
with my prediction: since sellers are no longer able to use retaliation to prevent buyers 
                                                        




from providing negative feedback, or eliminate negative feedback by revoking, they are 
expected to have more negative feedback displayed in their profiles under the new 
reputation mechanism. The significantly positive cofficient of Gi suggests that revokers 
are more likely to receive negative feedback than no -revokers in the pre-change period, 
as expected.  
Interestingly, the coefficient of Pt*G i is significantly negative across various 
specifications. This indicates that the increase in negative feedback percentage is much 
smaller for revokers than for non-revokers after revoking is disallowed. This result still 
holds after I control for possible seller fixed effects in the fixed effects logit model.   
Because negative feedback is extremely rare on eBay, I also estimate a rare-event 
logit model to correct for the potential underestimation bias, as suggested by King and 
Zeng (2001). I once again observe a significantly negative coefficient of the interaction 
term Pt*G i as shown in Model 2.  
As a further robustness check, I add transaction-related variables such as the 
duration of the transaction (i.e., the interval between the listing date and the transaction 
closing date) and the final price into the conventio al logit regression analyses. The 
estimates are reported in Model 4 and Model 5.While t e sample size is reduced due to 
missing values in these two variables in the raw data, I find that all major results hold. 
In the formal difference-in-differences model, I assume that the error term εit 
follows an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) standard logistic distribution. 
However, as Bertrand et al. (2004) suggests, serial correlation between εit and εit+1 can 
lead to an underestimation of the standard error and an overestimation of t-statistics and 
significance levels. One way to circumvent this issue without making any specific 
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assumption about the autocorrelation form is to aggre ate the time series information.  
Therefore as a robustness check, I aggregate the daa at two levels for further robustness 
checks. 
First, I aggregate each seller’s performance by month. The dependent variable 
now is the seller’s monthly aggregated percentage of negative feedback, a ratio whose 
predicted value should also fall between 0 and 1, requi ing the use of a generalized linear 
model (Papke and Wooldridge 1996). As shown in Model 6 of Table 2.7, the coefficient 
of Pt*G i is consistently significantly negative.  
Second, I aggregate each seller’s overall performance i  the pre-change and the 
post-change period. As shown in Figure 2.2, the displayed negative feedback percentage 
increases for all sellers (1.49% to 1.54% for revokers, and 0.47% to 0.87% for non-
revokers). However, the 0.05% increase in actual negative feedback percentage for 
revokers is much lower than the 0.40% increase for non-revokers, and the difference is 
statistically significant at the 10% level (t-value=-1.90). 
Overall, I find that while both revokers and non-revokers experience a higher 
percentage of negative ratings in the post-change period, the magnitude of the increase is 
much smaller for revokers. Prior literature (e.g, Pavlou and Dimoka 2006) has suggested 
that feedback can be a proxy for the effort exerted by a seller in a transaction. The 
difference-in-differences estimate therefore provides supporting evidence that revokers 
exert extra efforts (compared to non-revokers) to improve service quality. This indicates 
that retaliators changed their behavior in a positive way to mitigate the increase in 
negative feedback caused by the change in the reputation mechanism. 
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Broadening the Definition of Strategic Sellers: while revokers are defined here 
as sellers who had successfully convinced a buyer to revoke negative feedback, there are 
also 57 sellers in the sample who retaliated but with no success in revoking. These cases 
might be caused by the inadequate effort the seller made to negotiate with the buyer. 
Despite the fact that a revocation outcome was not reached in these cases, retaliation 
nonetheless reflects a seller’s endeavor to game the reputation system under the old 
policy. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that not only revokers but also sellers who 
retaliated (even though did not successfully revoke), would be affected by the change in 
the feedback policy. Accordingly, I use “retaliators” to denote the combination of 
revokers and sellers who retaliated but did not succeed in revoking. In total, I have 255 
retaliators. Using propensity score matching method based on reputation score, tenure on 
eBay, and average product price, I construct a matched sample of 255 non-retaliators who 
had never retaliated against any negative feedback and who did not involve in revoking. 
The results of the difference-in-differences model are shown in Table 2.8.Iconsistently 
find that retaliators improve their efforts more compared to non-retaliators after the 
policy change. This suggests that my findings are applicable to a broader range of 
strategic sellers in addition to pure revokers. 
2.4.2.4 Falsification Test and Additional Robustness Checks 
 
Falsification Test: as discussed earlier, the focus of above analysis is how the behavior 
of strategic sellers is affected by the changes to the reputation system. I find evidence that 
there are sellers who previously attempted to fix their reputations by retaliating against 
buyers and revoking negative feedback. After revoking is banned these sellers began 
making more efforts to improve their services. To further verify this inference, I also 
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conduct a falsification test. Specifically, there ar  sellers who, upon receiving negative 
feedback, did not retaliate against the buyer. Rather, they admitted their mistakes and 
take action of remedies, and then asked the buyers to withdraw the negative feedback. To 
further corroborate that these sellers were behaving honestly, I examine the 
communications between buyers and sellers through text replies to negative feedback. I 
find that these sellers typically did not retaliate b cause they committed a genuine error 
and were attempting to fix it (for instance replies include “Would be happy to give a full 
refund” and “Sorry for the confusion, I guarantee quality and delivery, will get enough 
back!”). I call these sellers “honest revokers”.  Since this group of sellers do not 
strategically retaliate buyers with negative feedback, they should be less affected by the 
policy change. In other words, this group of “revokers” should behave differently from 
strategic revokers.  
I identify a total of 98 honest revokers in the sample. Using similar propensity 
score matching method based on reputation score, tenure on eBay, and the average 
product price of the seller’s listings, 98 non-revokers are matched as the control group. 
The comparison of reputation profiles between these two groups is shown in Table 2.9. 
Even though honest revokers initially receive more negative feedback than non-
revokers, they look similar to non-revokers after co recting their mistakes and removing 
the negative feedback. This suggests that revoking is a useful tool for honest sellers to 
remedy their mistakes, perhaps the primary reason why eBay introduced this policy 




As shown in Model 1 and Model 2 of Table 2.10, the int raction term Pt*H i (Hi is 
a dummy variable for being an honest revoker) is not significant. This result strengthens 
the finding that only retaliators who used to behave strategically are incentivized to 
perform better after the policy change. 
Examining Changes in Positive Feedback: In the above analyses, I focus on the 
negative feedback received by sellers. As another robustness test, I examine the positive 
feedback received by the strategic sellers after the policy change. 
If my finding is correct that retaliators exert more efforts than non-retaliators after 
the policy change, this should be reflected in the positive feedback they receive as well. 
In other words, because of their improved service quality in the post-period, these 
retaliators should also experience a greater increase in the likelihood of receiving positive 
feedback than non-retaliators when compared to the pre-change period. The empirical 
finding confirms this conjecture. As shown in Model 3 and Model 4 of Table 2.10, the 
coefficient of Pt*G i is consistently positive and significant in both random effects logit 
model and fixed effects logit model. These tests give us greater confidence that the 
reputation system change does motivate strategic sellers to improve their efforts to serve 
buyers. 
I further carefully examine and rule out alternative explanations why retaliators 
are less likely to receive negative feedback in thepost-change period, other than 
improving efforts8,  as detailed below. 
(1) Switching product categories. One alternative explanation for retaliators’ 
“improved” feedback scores compared with non-retalia ors is that retaliators simply 
switch to safer product categories instead of improving their services. To rule out this 
                                                        
8 I conduct all of these checks for revokers vs. non-revokers and obtain consistent results. 
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possible alternative explanation, I first calculate th  distribution of listings among product 
categories for retaliators and non-retaliators in the pre-change period and the post-change 
period. I then compare the change in each product category for retaliators and non- 
retaliators. As shown in Figure 2.3, no significant difference is detected between 
retaliators and non- retaliators in terms of changes in the total number of product 
categories they are selling and the percentage of listings in the top 5 product categories 
sold9.   
Researchers have argued that different product categories might inherently have 
different potentials for receiving negative feedback. For example, MacInnes et al. (2005) 
find that in eBay online auctions, transactions in services are more likely to result in 
disputes than transactions in physical goods. Scott and Gregg (2004) propose that, when 
purchased online, high sensory products such as clothing and furniture are more likely to 
generate negative feedback compared with low sensory pr ducts. Product categories may 
differ in their inherent riskiness and, consequently, in the number of complaints received 
by their sellers (MacInnes et al. 2005). This product category risk is aligned with the 
consumers’ beliefs regarding whether the products will perform according to their 
expectations (Bhatnagar et al. 2000). Product category risk increases with greater 
technical complexity, price, and needs of feel and touch (Bhatnagar et al. 2000, Chang et 
al. 2006; Finch 2007). I then examine whether retaliators have switched to low-risk 
product categories more than non-retaliators after the change in the reputation 
mechanism. I consider only the top 5 product categori s: clothing, collectibles, books, 
jewelry, and electronics. These top 5 categories account for about half of all listings. 
Clothing is considered a high-risk product category because of the sensory nature of the 
                                                        
9 This result also holds for the rest of the 26 product categories. 
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product and the difficulty in describing its features accurately (Bhatnagar et al. 2000). 
Collectibles are considered a high-risk product category because they have many 
attributes and a complex description is required (Scott and Gregg 2004). Books, which 
are typically lower priced items, are considered a low-risk product category. Jewelry is 
considered a high-risk product category as sellers who cheat stand to benefit more from 
higher price items. Electronics are considered to be a high-risk product category because, 
in general, electronic items are technically and descriptively complex. According to 
Bhatnagar et al. (2000)’s rank of product category risk, electronics are much riskier than 
clothing and books.  
Figure 2.4 presents the percentage of listings in high-risk and low-risk product 
categories for retaliators and non-retaliators. Retaliators and non-retaliators show similar 
proportion of listings in high-risk products and low-risk products respectively in both the 
pre-change and the post-change periods. Also, the magnitudes of change for retaliators 
and non-retaliators are not significantly different.  
(2) Buying reputation. Another potential alternative explanation for retaliators’ 
smaller increase in negative feedback is that retaliators strategically buy more positive 
feedback through selling very low-value items to buyers and engaging in reciprocally 
positive feedback exchange (Dini and Spagnolo 2009). Typically the title of such listings 
clearly states “100% positive feedback.” However, an examination of the product listings 
by both retaliators and non-retaliators suggest thano such feedback-buying behavior 
exists. 
(3) Sell-through rates. In the above analysis, I focus on seller reputation profiles. 
Another important measure of seller performance is the sell-through rate, which has 
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important implications for market liquidity and efficiency. As shown in Figure 2.5, 
retaliators and non-retaliators do not differ in their sell-through rates for both high-risk 
and low-risk products. Also, there is no difference in the magnitudes of change in sell-
through rates between the two groups of sellers (t-value=-1.13). This indicates that the 
smaller increase in negative feedback for retaliators is not driven by successfully selling 
more low-risk product categories but in instead largely due to their quality improvement 
in selling. 
(4) Product price. It is possible that retaliators might be likely to intentionally 
reduce the product price to lower buyers’ expectations of service quality in order to get 
less negative feedback in the post-change period. Therefore I compare the average 
change in product price from the pre-change period to the post-change period for both 
retaliators and non-retaliators. As shown in Figure 2.6, I do not find any significant 
difference between retaliators and non-retaliators f r both high-risk products and low-risk 
products. This helps rule out the alternative explanation.   
To summarize, my results consistently show that the reputation system design has 
a meaningful and significant impact on seller behavior. After the power balance shifts in 
favor of buyers, retaliators improve their efforts more than non-retaliators in the post-
change period, and therefore have smaller increase in n gative feedback. 
2.5 Discussion and Implications 
 
Reputation mechanisms are vital to the success of online marketplaces such as eBay. 
However, the efficacy of these mechanisms depends crucially on how robust they are to 
potential gaming by participants. My s is among the first studies to examine strategic 
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gaming behavior in the context of online reputation systems. I utilize the policy change 
on eBay – banning revoking – to examine the impact of reputation system design on 
seller behavior. My analysis of the protest/strike following the new policy announcement 
provides supporting evidence that strategic sellers do react strongly to the reputation 
system change: those who have revoked before are much ore likely to participate in the 
online strike. After the new policy is implemented, I find that in general, buyers are more 
likely to leave negative feedback after the seller oses the power to retaliate. More 
interestingly, I find that those strategic sellers have indeed acted opportunistically as they 
exert more efforts to improve the quality of their transactions. 
The current findings make significant contributions to the literature on online 
reputation mechanism design (see Dellarocas 2005; Fan et al. 2005; Qu et al. 2008; Zhou 
et al.2008). A reputation mechanism should facilitate market transactions by separating 
good players (either sellers or buyers) from bad ones and inducing honest behavior. I 
provide the first empirical evidence that sellers do respond to the design of the reputation 
mechanism. Allowing revoking of feedback facilitates sellers’ strategic gaming behavior. 
After revoking is disabled, the more opportunistic sellers “behave better”. This finding 
has important implications for the theoretical work n reputation systems as well, as it is 
a crucial assumption to what degree the models can assume that sellers be motivated to 
behave by a reputation system (Barr-Issac and Tadelis 2008). I find support to both 
hidden information and hidden efforts: strategic sellers improve their services after the 
policy change, but the reputation scores are now reveal d as worse than average, as 
reflected in Figure 2.2 (1.54% negative feedback for revokers and 0.87% negative 
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feedback for non-revokers, t-value=2.05). Therefore, th  mixed model is likely closer to 
reality. 
Furthermore, by examining the buyer-seller interactions before and after a 
fundamental change this study contributes to the understanding of reputation system 
design by shedding light on the importance of the power balance between the buyer and 
the seller on the effectiveness of a reputation mechanism. This study also contributes to 
the understanding of the emerging influence of users’ actual interactions with feedback 
systems and other information systems on market mechanism design, as noted by Bapna 
et al. (2004) and Adomavicius et al. (2011). 
The paper also contributes to the growing literature on ways that retailers can 
strategically influence buyer reviews. Whereas Stephen et al. (2012) show that monetary 
incentives offered by sellers can lead buyers to leave more helpful reviews, Cabral and Li 
(2012) find that monetary rewards can only increase the likelihood of buyers leaving 
unbiased ratings but not the values of the ratings. Abeler et al. (2010) examine sellers’ 
response to negative buyer reviews by comparing private apology to monetary 
compensation and find the former more effective in motivating buyers to withdraw 
negative ratings. Similarly, Gu and Ye (2011) find that a public management response 
can increase the future satisfaction of buyers who leave negative ratings. Jiang and Guo 
(2012) argue that retailers should allow more rating scales for popular products and fewer 
rating scales for niche products in order to induce more positive ratings. This study 
makes contributions to this line of literature by studying sellers’ strategic gaming 
behavior with reputation systems. 
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This paper is also part of the growing literature on gaming behavior in online 
marketplaces. Kauffman and Wood (2005) examine the shilling behavior of sellers to 
artificially raise bidding prices. Cabral and Hortacsu (2010) find that roughly one-third of 
sellers built their reputations by acting as a buyer first. Jin and Kato (2006) find that some 
eBay sellers make non-credible claims of quality and mislead buyers. Stephen and 
Toubia (2010) find that sellers can strategically increase revenues by creating incoming 
links from other sellers who are dispersed. I contribu e to the above literature by 
introducing a new way to study seller strategic behavior. This work is also related to the 
question of how consumers should interpret sellers’ online reputations. Zhang (2006) 
finds that reputations as a seller and as a buyer have different impacts on closing price. 
My findings imply that reputation system should make consumers aware of seller 
strategic behavior to better differentiate their qualities. 
Managerially, this study has two implications. First, the finding that revoking 
elicits strategic behavior in sellers suggests that, when revoking is available to sellers, 
online market makers should adopt other measures to reveal more quality information to 
buyers. One potential way to do this is to take revok d feedback into account when 
calculating overall reputation and to display the prcentage of revoked feedback to 
buyers. Currently there is no easy and straightforward way of getting this information 
from eBay or other similar markets. Second, while banning revoking and the possibility 
of retaliation by sellers might help mitigate the retaliation problem, such a change could 
unduly shift the balance of power in favor of buyers. Providing more detailed and 
granular feedback and reputation scores (for instance, their reputation in their role as a 
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buyer versus seller) could help alleviate such a power imbalance, making the market 
participants less vulnerable to strategic transaction partners. 
I acknowledge several limitations in this study. First, in order to ensure that I 
examine active sellers with substantial number of transactions, who account for the 
majority of the transactions on eBay, I restrict myinvestigation to sellers with lifetime 
total feedback of 500 or more. Second, eBay made some ther changes in October of 
2008 (e.g. no checks or money order as payment methods, as detailed in footnote 4). 
While I have limited my sample period to July-Septemb r, which is ahead of these 
changes, the announcement effect may potentially inf ue ce selling behavior. Since these 
changes are not related to the reputation mechanism, I believe the confounding effects of 
these other changes, should be trivial or nonexistent. Third, while I have controlled for 
change in buyer feedback-leaving behavior in the difference-in-differences model, direct 
investigation of buyer behavior using detailed buyer-side data would provide further 
support for my findings. Finally, I infer the seller behavioral change using buyer 
feedback. Future research could strengthen the findings by seeking more direct measures 
of seller efforts and service quality. 
The study can be extended in a number of interesting ways. For instance, one 
might conduct a more detailed analysis of how the process of revoking unfolds by 
looking at both sellers’ and buyers’ detailed feedback behavior. It is also important to 
understand how the changes in reputation mechanism influence market efficiency. A 
detailed comparison of final auction prices between r taliators and non-retaliators may 
shed light on this. Finally, it would be interesting to examine whether banning revoking 
in the new system benefits eBay or not. Prior to the policy change, eBay’s reputation 
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mechanism was more symmetric with both buyers and seller  being allowed to post 
positive, neutral, or negative feedback about their transaction partners. However, the 
inherent asymmetry in the value of reputations (i.e. a good reputation is more valuable to 
a seller than it is to a buyer), made revoking more attractive to sellers. The change in the 
design of the reputation mechanism from a symmetric to an asymmetric one is likely to 
be in line with the asymmetric value of reputation t  sellers and buyers, and therefore 
optimal. On the other hand, it is possible that these changes make buyers more powerful 
and induce them to behave opportunistically. For example, buyers may slow down their 
payment speed without worrying about negative feedback from the sellers, or buyers may 
make fraudulent claims of product defects or return products for senseless reasons. In 
more extreme cases, bad buyers might make excessive demand on sellers by threatening 
to leave negative feedback. Further research is needed on the costs and benefits of a 
symmetric versus an asymmetric feedback mechanism. Also, I find supporting evidence 
that sellers improve their services as reflected in buyer feedback. Future research could 
look at more direct measures of seller efforts, and provide a deeper understanding of how 
these efforts lead to better reputation portfolios. 




Chapter 3: Truck, Barter and Exchange: An Empirical 
Investigation of Reciprocity in Online P2P Bartering 
 
 
“The propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another... is common to all 
men, and to be found in no other race of animals... Nobody ever saw a dog make a fair 
and deliberate exchange of one bone for another with another dog.”   
   -Adam Smith (1776) 
 
3.1 Introduction  
  
Barter, defined as the exchange of goods or services without money changing hands, has 
been used throughout the world for centuries since troduced in the pre-historic times. 
This most primitive form of transaction incurs higher transaction costs than monetary 
transactions for three major reasons. First, in a direct barter market, a trader who has 
apples but wants bananas must wait until someone willing to give up bananas for apples 
shows up. This search for “double coincidence of wants” is costlier than the combination 
of a search for a buyer who will pay money for apples and a search for a seller of bananas 
(Heller and Starr 1976; Jevons 1985). Second, fiat money has virtually zero storage and 
transfer cost, making its exchange for goods less co tly than the exchange of goods for 
goods (Freeman 1989). Third, each trader has private information about own-produced 
goods due to social specialization. This information asymmetry can incentivize the trader 
to produce low-quality products and take advantage of uninformed trading partners (Kim 
1996). Fiat money, whose value is identifiable by every trader, reduces the information 
acquisition cost needed to mitigate the moral hazard and adverse selection problem in 
exchange of goods (Banerjee and Maskin 1996; Brunner a d Meltzer 1971). As a result, 
41 
 
money arises endogenously from an evolutionary process as the predominant medium of 
exchange in modern society. 
However, recent developments of Internet and Web 2.0 technologies have greatly 
reduced transaction costs associated with barter transactions. Electronic marketplaces 
overcome the geographic constraint, connect individuals from all over the world, and 
allow them to search for potential trade partners ea ily and at a nearly zero cost (Bakos 
1997). Virtual currency, which usually has all of the characteristics of fiat money such as 
zero storage and transfer cost (Yamaguchi 2004), can be used as the medium of exchange 
in online barter market. Online reputation systems, which help communicate product and 
trading partner quality and promote trust among buyers and sellers, have proved to be 
effective in reduce information asymmetry and the “lemons” problem (Dellarocas 2003). 
Due to reduced transaction costs, the past four yeas h ve witnessed the growth of 
various online peer-to-peer (P2P) barter marketplaces. For example, there are barter 
marketplaces focused on books such as Paperbackswap.com and Swap.com, 
marketplaces focused on clothes such as thredUp.com, marketplaces focused on music 
and movies such as SwapaCD.com and SwapaDVD.com, marketplaces focused on 
housing such as HomeExchange.com, and marketplaces op n to anything such as 
BarterQuest.com.  
This study is among the first to systematically examine the emerging trading 
model--online P2P barter markets. Traditional electronic marketplaces are based on the 
monetary system that operates under the maxim “money buys goods and goods buy 
money; but goods do not buy goods” (Davidson 1972). Because money is a universally 
accepted medium of exchange, sellers can use the mon y from selling goods or services 
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outside the electronic marketplace. However, in barter markets typically no real money is 
involved. There are two major forms of barter: direct barter and indirect barter (Oh 1989; 
Rice 2003). Direct barter is the exchange of one good from one party for another good 
from the other party. Indirect barter involves the use of an intermediary good such as 
virtual point. In indirect barter marketplaces, one good from one party is given to the 
second party in exchange for the intermediary good, and afterwards the intermediary 
good can be used by the first party to exchange for an ther good from a third party. To 
increase the efficiency of transactions, nowadays mo t barter markets are indirect barter 
markets, which are different from traditional money-based online markets in three 
aspects. First, because the intermediary good gained from giving a good is usually 
valuable only in the same marketplace, it helps increase market participants’ loyalty and 
commitment to the market (Ji et al. 2008). Second, whereas traditional online market is 
often characterized by one-shot interactions (Resnick and Zeckhauser 2002), online 
barter markets allow the potential for developing lasting relationships over time among 
participants as they are devoted to the market, especially given that participants are often 
like-minded individuals when the barter market is focused on a particular type of good 
such as books. Third, whereas in traditional money-based online markets formal contracts 
are often involved to govern transactions, online barter markets more reply on norms of 
reciprocity and implicit contracts (Kaikati 1976). 
The above distinct natures of online barter markets imply that participants seem to 
exhibit more needs for developing long-term relationships in the market, and this might 
affect how they search for and choose transaction partners. Despite the growing literature 
on online markets, few studies have focused on the relationship between market 
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participants and how it might influence transaction process and outcomes. To bridge the 
gap, this study seeks to understand how individuals search for transaction partners given 
the needs for relationship building and how different search strategies might affect 
transaction outcomes and market efficiency in online P2P barter marketplaces. More 
specifically, I try to answer the following three questions: 
• What are the predominant search strategies in P2P barter markets? 
• How do different search strategies affect transaction outcomes in P2P barter 
markets? 
• How can P2P market makers effectively identify user gments of different 
search strategies? 
Drawing upon literature on buyer-seller relationship  and reciprocity and using detailed 
transaction level data from a leading online P2P indirect barter marketplace, I show that 
there are three dominant search strategies in P2P barter markets: indirect reciprocity, 
immediate reciprocity, and delayed reciprocity. I further show that these three search 
strategies have differential impacts on transaction outcomes: compared to the baseline of 
indirect reciprocity search strategy, immediate reciprocity search strategy increases 
service quality for the current transaction and delay d reciprocity search strategy 
provides better match for transaction needs. Based on the existing secondary data as well 
as survey results, I further show that individuals with different transaction needs and 
psychographic profiles adopt different search strategies in the market. As the first study 
to systematically examine online P2P barter markets using real transaction data, my study 
also make significant contributions to the existing literature on reciprocity by examining 
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the differential impacts of different forms of reciprocity on transaction outcomes and how 
different individuals choose different reciprocity strategies.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the theoretical 
motivation and review of relevant literature. Section 3.3 describes the research context. 
Section 3.4 presents the data analyses and results. Section 3.5 concludes.  
3.2 Literature Review 
 
3.2.1 Literature on Barter 
 
Previous research on bartering falls into two major streams. The first stream of research 
focuses on macroeconomics of the barter market and co sistently concludes that barter 
markets are in general less efficient compared withthe monetary market (e.g., Banerjee 
and Maskin 1996; Brunner and Meltzer 1971; Freeman 1989). Nevertheless, barter is still 
widely used in this monetary economy. According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, 
barter accounts for about 30 percent to 40 percent of the world's total business. In the 
U.S., over 250,000 businesses actively participate in barter (Rice 2003). The second 
stream of research focuses on barter practice between firms and provides theoretical 
justifications for the use of bartering by firms. For example, Magenheim and Murrell 
(1988) show that barter can serve as a hidden pricediscrimination device by helping not 
reveal the firm’s type to future customers. Prendergast and Stole (2001) show that barter 
helps firms to generate liquidity and segment the market into high-demand and low-
demand customers when liquidity constraints do not all w firms to discriminate through 
money. Guriev (2004) shows that barter can emerge as a means of screening high quality 
buyers from low quality buyers even when there are no financial constraints. Marin and 
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Schnitzer (2005) show that barter can be used by a firm to collateralize a trade credit to 
maintain production when the firm faces a severe creditworthiness problem.  
Despite the justification of barter practice among firms, little research has been 
done on barter exchange among individuals. As best as I know, my study is the first to 
examine barter exchange among individuals using large scale transaction data. 
3.2.2 Literature on Transactional vs. Relational View 
 
As discussed earlier, market participants in online barter markets might have a stronger 
need for establishing ongoing relationships in the market. In the marketing literature, an 
exchange between the buyer and the seller can be viewed as discrete (or transactional) or 
relational (Macneil 1980). The discrete transaction view treats exchanges as characterized 
by very little communication between the buyer and the seller, one-time interaction and 
sharp ending of the buyer-seller relationship. In this view, the exchange between the 
buyer and the seller is pure transaction and it excludes relational elements.  The relational 
view treats exchange between the buyer and the sellr as ongoing relationships that 
transpire over time. In this view, the buyer and the seller may develop obligations and 
norms to facilitate future collaboration. Exchanges built from the relational view are 
often repeated as the buyer and the seller engage in social exchange. Researchers like 
Dwyer et al. (1987) argue that some elements of a “rel tionship” underlie all transactions 
and the exchange between the buyer and the seller should be treated as a continuum, 
ranging from discrete to relational. 
Whereas discrete transactions are often governed by full written contracts, 
relational exchanges heavily rely on the enforcement of “relational contracts” which are 
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implicitly stated (Lambe et al. 2000). Even though there are no formal contracts guiding 
transactions in the online barter markets, market par icipants may still develop implicit 
contracts with each other to govern the exchange relationships. One type of such implicit 
contracts can be psychological contracts. Barter can be seen as a subtype of gift exchange 
(Bell 1991), which gives rises to psychological contracts between the giver and the 
receiver (Davis 2009; Schein 1965). A psychological contract is an individual’s belief in 
mutual obligations between himself/herself and another party and is formed under the 
norm of direct reciprocity (Coyle-Shapiro and Kesslr 2002; Dabos and Rousseau 2004). 
Psychological contracts exist between buyers and seller  in online markets and affect 
their transaction decisions (Pavlou and Gefen 2005). These prior studies suggest that 
transactions in online barter markets might also have relational elements. 
One of the observable relations between market participants over time is 
reciprocal relationship. In indirect barter markets, the transaction between two individuals 
can become bi-directional and repeatedly bi-directional over time, giving birth to 
reciprocity. 
3.2.3 Literature on Reciprocity 
 
The study on reciprocity traces back to earlier evoluti nary biology research on 
cooperation in humans and other species. Several theories have been proposed to explain 
the evolution of cooperation behavior. The theory of reciprocal altruism posits that 
species engage in bilateral cooperation in pursuit of net benefits (Trivers 1971). The 
theory of indirect reciprocity posits that species helping others build a reputation or 
image score for themselves. This positive signal allows them to benefit from others in 
larger groups in the future (Nowak and Sigmund 2005; Zahavi 1995).  
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The theory of reciprocity to explain human behavior by evolutionary biologists is 
echoed by behavior experiments in economics. Berg et al. (1995) design an investment 
game to study reciprocity among individuals. In the investment game, subjects in room A 
decided how much of their $10 in hand to send to an anonymous counterpart in room B. 
Subjects were informed that the amount being sent would be tripled when it reaches room 
B. Then the anonymous counterpart in Room B decided how much of the tripled 
endowment to give back to the donor in room A. Whereas standard economic theory 
assuming self-interest and rationality predicts that subjects in room A should send zero 
amount, Berg et al. (1995) find that over 90% of the subjects in room A sent some money 
in the expectation of a positive return. Fehr et al. (1998) and Kirchler et al. (1996) design 
a gift-exchange experiment in which the subject representing the firm makes a wage offer 
to the subject representing the worker and then the worker decides how much effort to 
provide. Contrary to what standard money-maximizing theory would predict, they find 
strong social norm of reciprocity—a positive correlation between effort level and wage 
level. Their findings are further supported by the bilateral gift-experiments in Charness 
(2004). The conflict between observed direct reciprocation behavior and the hypotheses 
of self-interest and rationality can be explained by evolutionary game theory. According 
to evolutionary game theory, more successful strategies and behavior will survive and 
less successful ones will be washed out (Sethi and Somanathan 2003). Although self-
interested individuals can gain more by defecting (i.e., not reciprocate), humans have 
evolved mental algorithms for identifying and punishing cheaters (Hoffman et al. 1998). 
Guth et al. (1982) and Ochs and Roth (1989) find that individuals are willing to punish 
opportunists even when it is costly. Therefore, self-regarding cheating is unstable in the 
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presence of preference towards reciprocal cooperation in the long run and reciprocity 
dominates as a norm during the evolution process (Sethi and Somanathan 2001). 
Besides direct reciprocity in bilateral interactions (if you scratch my back, I will 
scratch yours), indirect reciprocity (if I scratch your back, somebody else will scratch 
mine) also proves to be important in explaining helping and cooperation. Indirect 
reciprocity is implemented via image scoring and is also evolutionarily stable (Nowak 
and Sigmund 2005). Individuals build image score by helping others and high image 
score leads to higher probability of being helped by a third party. Seinen and Schram 
(2006) designed a repeated helping game in which two subjects were randomly matched 
and randomly assigned the role of donor and recipient followed by the donor’s decision 
to whether help the recipient or not. They find that the probability that the donor helps 
increases as the recipient’s image score built from her behavior as a donor increases, 
providing support for indirect reciprocity. Engelmann and Fischbacher (2009) posit that 
indirect reciprocity can be either strategic or pure. Image scoring provides incentives for 
individuals to strategically build publicly visible reputation and image scores by helping 
others in the expectation of net positive benefits in the long run. In pure indirect 
reciprocity, donors are more willing to help recipients with a higher image score even 
when image scoring on the donor’s side is disallowed. Engelmann and Fischbacher 
(2009) further conduct a modified version of the repeated helping game and find support 
for both pure indirect reciprocity and strategic indirect reciprocity. 
Several other studies compare the direct reciprocity mechanism with the indirect 
reciprocity mechanism to see which one induces more c operation. Dufwenberg et al. 
(2001) conduct a revised version of Berg et al. (1995)’s investment game and find that 
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the average amount of donation under indirect recipo ty is only insignificantly smaller 
than the donation under direct reciprocity. However, Guth et al. (2001) show that 
compared with direct reciprocity mechanism, indirect reciprocity induces substantially 
reduced amount of donations. Stanca (2009) conduct similar experiments and find that 
indirect reciprocity has a significantly stronger effect on donation than direct reciprocity.  
In the sociology literature, reciprocity is regarded as one of the fundamental 
norms underlying social exchange wherein resources ar  transacted among individuals 
(Gouldner 1960). Network exchange theory and social exchange theory are two 
complementary theories that have been proposed to explain individual behaviors and 
interpersonal relations in social exchange processes. Whereas network exchange theory 
primarily focuses on individuals’ positions and power issues in a network context, social 
exchange theory primarily focuses on individuals’ actu l interactions and the 
consequences of relationships (Faraj and Johnson 2010). According to network exchange 
theory, individuals deliberately choose partners by carefully evaluating their resources 
and the possibility of reciprocation before engaging i  an exchange relationship (Willer 
1999). According to social exchange theory, indirect iprocity involves higher risk than 
direct reciprocity, because individuals are dependent on the actions of multiple others 
from whom they cannot directly benefit, with risk increasing in proportion to the length 
of the chain (Molm et al. 2007). In addition, due to the lack of ability to directly reward 
or punish a trusting or non-trusting partner in indirect reciprocity, the quality of 
reciprocation is expected to be lower in indirect reciprocity than in direct reciprocity 
(Buchan et al. 2002). However, other researchers like Bearman (1997) and Takahashi 
(2000) argue that the value of reciprocity should not be sensitive to its form: once an 
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individual takes resources, she is obligated to return hem to someone in the future. In 
this study, I will empirically examine whether direct reciprocity and indirect reciprocity 
lead to differential outcomes in online P2P barter ma kets. 
Whereas many of the existing studies treat reciprocty as a behavior, reciprocity 
can also be treated as a relationship shared between one individuals and his/her partner 
which is consumed in the future and gives both of them utility (Leidner et al. 2009). This 
corresponds to the relational view of exchange or scial exchange theory. More 
specifically in online indirect barter markets, three types of reciprocity relation could 
happen: (1) an individual A gives some goods to individual B but receives other goods 
from a third individual C and never meet with A again. This is indirect reciprocity. 
Because the transaction between A and B is only one-time, and A and B do not develop 
relations over time, this exchange is similar to the discrete transaction scenario; (2) an 
individual A gives some goods to individual B and later on after some time ask for other 
goods back from individual B. Later on, A and B start o have repeated transactions with 
each other. This case is a direct reciprocal relationship between A and B, and it is similar 
to the relational transaction scenario; (3) an individual A gives some goods to individual 
B and ask for other goods back from individual B immediately or within a very short time 
period. This is a case in between discrete transaction and relational exchange as A and B 
develops some extent of direct reciprocal relationship which might not be long-lived. To 
differentiate between (2) and (3), I call (2) delayd reciprocity and (3) immediate 
reciprocity. Because the three types of reciprocal rel tion reflect how an individual search 
for and choose a transaction partner, I also call this the search strategy for the individual. 
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Existing studies on transactional vs. relational views of exchange have shown that 
individuals may strategically engage in relational exchange (Gomes-Casseres 1987). 
Given the three possible different types of relationship, I next examine how these 
different search strategies have influences on transaction outcomes and how different 
individuals choose different search strategies. 
3.3 Research Context 
 
I collect data from a leading online P2P barter marketplace for books. Although most of 
the market participants are from the United States, the site is open to individuals from all 
over the world. More than 1000 books are bartered every day. The market is an indirect 
barter market based on an intermediary good called “point”. Every book request costs the 
requestor 1 point (or 3, if book owner resides in another country). Every book given away 
earns the giver 1 point (or 3, if it is sent overseas). Book owners add books they have to 
their inventory lists. Individuals can also add books they want into their wishlists. Both 
the inventory list and the wishlist of an individual are available for others to see.  
Similar to eBay, the market allows book requesters and book givers to rate each 
other. Each market participant has an overall feedback score equal to the number of 
positive feedbacks minus the number of negative feedbacks. A user can also give her 
partner additional special praise -- publicly visible thanks plus 1 point donated to the 
partner--after a satisfactory transaction. In addition, a number of other indices regarding 
the user’s giving and receiving history such as the number of books reported by the book 
requester as lost in the mail, and the number of rejections to others’ requests, are also 
publicly displayed in every participant’s profile page. These serve to signal each 
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participant’s image score reflected in previous barter performance. This provides a basis 
for indirect reciprocity, wherein one person’s kind or hostile acts to another person are 
rewarded or punished by a third party.  
I first take a snapshot of all individuals’ data onNovember 1st 2010. Then I 
collect detailed transaction data for each individual from November 1st 2010 to May 1st 
2011 in the barter marketplace. 245191 transactions involving 19261 users were traded 
during the period. 
3.4 Data Analyses 
3.4.1 The Impact of Search Strategy: Individual-Level Analysis 
 
To examine the impact of different search strategies on transaction outcomes, I first have 
to uncover the distinct search strategy patterns in the market, I use a two-step cluster 
analysis approach with complementary methods as sugge ted by prior studies (e.g., 
Ketchen and Shook 1996; Viswanathan et al. 2007). Each individual is represented by 
his/her distribution of transactions among the three search strategies (indirect_pct, 
immediate_pct, delayed_pct)10 by November 1st 2010. First, I employ the hierarchical 
clustering technique with Ward’s minimum variance mthod, which minimizes the total 
within-cluster variance and is relatively insensitive to outliers (Jobson 1992).  The 
stopping rule from Calinski and Harabasz index is used to determine the appropriate 
                                                        
10 Transactions initiated by indirect reciprocity are defined as transactions wherein the book requester A 
requests a book from book owner B whom he/she has not given a book to after he has given a book to at 
least another individual C. Transactions initiated by immediate reciprocity are defined as transactions 
wherein the book requester A requests a book from bok owner B whom he/she has just given a book to in
the past 7 days.  Transactions initiated by delayed reciprocity are defined as transactions wherein the book 
requester A requests a book from book owner B whom e/she has given a book to more than 7 days ago.  I 
have tried different thresholds for defining immediate reciprocity (e.g., within 1 day; within 2 days; within 
5 days, etc) but get consistent results across all an yses. For simplicity, all the results for immediate 
reciprocity are based on the 7-day window definitio. 
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number of clusters because it provides the best results in Monte Carlo evaluations 
(Milligan and Cooper 1985). As shown in Table 3.1, the 3-cluster solution produces the 
highest value of the Calinski and Harabasz index and therefore is preferred to other 
solutions.  
Next, I use k-means clustering, which generally produces more homogenous 
clusters, to confirm the three clusters (Sireci, Robin, and Patelis 1999).  The three distinct 
clusters indicate distinct search strategy patterns as shown in Table 3.2: cluster 1 
represents individuals who mainly use the indirect reciprocity strategy; cluster 2 
represents individuals who mainly use the immediate reciprocity strategy; and cluster 3 
represents individuals who mainly use the delayed recip ocity strategy.  
Given the above cluster analysis results, I define the three groups of users with 
different search strategies directly from their past transaction histories. “Indirect 
reciprocity search users” are defined as individuals who have not engaged in any 
immediate reciprocity or delayed reciprocity. “Immediate reciprocity search users” are 
defined as individuals of whom at least 60% of all transactions are based on immediate 
reciprocity. “Delayed reciprocity search users” are defined as individuals of whom at 
least 60% of all transactions are based on delayed reciprocity. These three search 
strategies are mutually exclusive. As shown in Table 3.3, I identify 9156 users in the 
indirect reciprocity cluster, 317 users in the immediate reciprocity cluster, and 608 users 
in the delayed reciprocity cluster. Whereas the total number transactions by users in the 
indirect reciprocity cluster count for almost 80% of all transactions, on average each user 




I then examine whether using different search strategies results in differences in 
overall transaction outcomes, including rejection rate, service quality measured by the 
partner’s speed of delivery, wishlist fulfillment rate. As indicated by the following three 
estimations, I control for individual characteristic  such as whether they have a bio, how 
long they have stayed in the market, their feedback score, etc. 
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The descriptive statistics of all variables are shown in Table 3.4, and the 
correlation matrix is shown in Table 3.5. Because th hree estimations may have 
contemporaneous cross-equation error correlations, I use the seemingly unrelated 
regression estimation (SURE) model to estimate the three equations simultaneously. For 
equation (4) and (6), the dependent variable is a ratio whose predicted value should also 
fall between 0 and 1, requiring the use of a generaliz d linear model (Papke and 
Wooldridge 1996). The results of the SURE estimation are shown in Table 3.6. 
Whereas there is no difference among the three strategies in terms of ensuring 
transactions successes11, the usage of immediate reciprocity search strategy l ads to the 
fastest delivery speed and the usage of delayed reciprocity search strategy results in a 
                                                        
11 In general, the rejection rate in the marketplace is pretty low (less than 5%). 
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little bit faster delivery speed. Among the three strategies, immediate reciprocity search 
strategy results in much smaller wishlist fulfillment rate.  
3.4.2 The Impact of Reciprocity: Transaction-Level Analysis 
 
The above cross-sectional individual-level analyses suggest that different search 
strategies lead to different transaction outcomes. However, the cross-sectional analysis 
does not reflect the decision process made by individuals in the market. In this section, I 
examine whether individuals make different decision for transactions initiated by 
different search strategies using transaction-level panel data.  
First, I examine how book givers make decisions of whether to accept or reject a 
transaction request as well as how sooner to mail the book if he/she accepts the request 
based on the following model:   
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In equation (4) for estimating the propensity of a tr nsaction to happen, I also 
control for book characteristics such as book price, demand-to-supply ratio based on past 
transactions, as well as the number of alternative book owners who have the book at the 
time of the transaction. Book owners might be expecting for reciprocation when deciding 
to accept a transaction request or not. As a result, they are more likely to accept requests 
from users who will possibly in the future have books they want. People with similar 
tastes are more likely to exchange books with each other simply because one party is 
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more likely to have the book the other party wants. I use several similarity measures of 
book tastes between two individuals. Taste_similarity is calculated using the cosine 
similarity measure based on the books in users’ inventory lists. I first calculate each 
individual’s percentages of books in each of the 36 topics (e.g., Action & Adventure, Arts 
& Photography, Business & Investing, etc) and store hem as a vector to represent the 
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The resulting similarity ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating totally different book 
tastes, 1 indicating sharing exactly the same book taste, and in-between values indicating 
some level of similarity. The shared_genre variable measures the count of common 
genres of books the two individuals are both interested in. The r_focalgenre_depth 
variable measures how many other books in the genre of the requested book the book 
requester has at the time of the request as seen by the book owner. 
For equation (5) to estimate delivery speed, because the dependent variable 
depends on whether the transaction request is accepted or not, there might be some 
unobservable characteristics of the transaction that simultaneously make it successful and 
lead to faster delivery speed. If regressions are on only transactions that are accepted, I 
might have a selection bias problem. Therefore, I employ the Heckman two-stage model 
to overcome this issue. The first stage is a logit model in equation (4) which models 
whether a transaction is accepted or not. The second stage is an OLS regression that uses 
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the estimated inverse mills ratio from the first stage to account for selection bias in 
estimating the delivery speed.  
In equation (4), if_same_country is a dummy variable indicating if the book 
requester and the book giver are in the same country. Theoretically, a request from a user 
in a different country is less likely to be accepted by the book owner due to higher 
shipping cost endured by the book giver. However, if_same_country should have no 
impact on the delivery speed once the request is accepted. There, I use if_same_country 
as an instrument variable in estimating the likelihood of a transaction of being rejected or 
not. 
Individuals might send books in batches. To capture his possible batch-sending 
habit, I introduce another explanatory variable num_to_send, which measures how many 
other books the book owner is to send by the time of r quest. If the book owner has only 
a few books to be sent, he/she might wait for more requests from others before dropping 
by the post office and mailing all the books at once.  
When estimating equation (4) independently, I try both random effects model and 
fixed effects logit model. Hausman test is conducted to decide which model is more 
appropriate (chi-square=353.79, p-value=0.000). I reject the null hypothesis that the 
random effects model is preferable over the fixed effects model. Therefore, fixed effects 
logit model is used and the results are reported in Table 3.7. An individual’s past 
performance in the market has a significant impact on the likelihood of success for 
his/her request: the request from an individual who used to reject others’ requests or who 
has a low feedback score is more likely to be reject d. Also, requests for high value 
books are more likely to be rejected. However, how the transaction is initiated (i.e., 
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whether by indirect reciprocity, immediate reciprocity or delayed reciprocity) does not 
influence the possibility of rejection.  
As expected, the coefficient of if_same_country is significantly negative, 
suggesting that requests from overseas countries ar more likely to be rejected. The 
coefficient selection_bias is significant in the estimate results for delivery speed. These 
results suggest that if_same_country is a good instrument variable and it is reasonable to 
employ the Heckman 2-stage model to overcome the pot ntial selection bias problem. 
The batch-sending habit is supported by the significantly negative coefficient of 
num_to_send. Overall, the estimation results for delivery speed indicate that compared to 
transactions initiated by indirect reciprocity, trans ctions initiated by delayed reciprocity 
on average have a slightly faster delivery speed and transactions initiated by immediate 
reciprocity have the fastest delivery speed.    
I next employ the following model to examine how likely a book requested is in 
the book requestor’s wishlist. 
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Both random effects model and fixed effects logit model are conducted and 
Hausman test suggests that the fixed effects model should be used (chi-square=2267.50, 
p-value=0.000). As shown in Table 3.7, the coefficient of if_immediate is significantly 
negative. This indicates that a book requested by using the immediate reciprocity strategy 
is less likely to be on an individual’s wishlist compared to a book requested by using 
either the indirect reciprocity strategy or delayed r ciprocity strategy. Meanwhile, if the 
book requested is more wanted, it is also more likely to be on the book requester’s 
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wishlist. In addition, when the book requester and the book owner share high similarity in 
book tastes, the book is more likely to be on the book requester’s wishlist. 
Overall, the transaction-level data analysis produces consistent results with cross-
sectional individual-level data analysis: a transaction request using the immediate 
reciprocity strategy enjoys faster delivery speed but seems to be improvised, whereas a 
transaction request using the delayed reciprocity strategy has a better match with the 
book requester’s wishlist. 
3.4.3 The Transaction Partner Choice by Individuals 
 
The analyses so far consistently suggest that transactions initiated by different search 
strategies have differential outcomes and individuals who belong to different search 
strategy clusters overall derive different benefits. However, the observe search strategy 
cluster might be purely caused by the lack of choices: one individual might choose a 
transaction partner who happens to make the transaction immediate or delayed reciprocal 
only because there is no third person to request th book. To show that individuals belong 
to different search strategy clusters purposefully choose transaction partners differently, I 
examine how individuals initiate a transaction when there are multiple alternative choices 
using the following model: 
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In the marketplace, a transaction is initiated by a request from the book seeker to 
the book owner. In the estimation, I control for giver characteristics and similarity 
measures. I also control for one confounding factor, p sition, which is the ranking 
position of the focal alternative in the choice list. In addition, individuals may want to 
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help new members or do not trust new members much. As a result, I control for the 
tenure of the giver (g_tenure_in_month) in the estimation. Finally, book givers who have 
not been active recently might not be chosen becaus the book requester is not sure if the 
book giver would respond to his/her request or not.Therefore, I control for how many 
months has passed since the potential giver’s last login time (g_last_login_month). 
 Multinomial logit model assumes that everybody faces the same choice set and 
the decision is only dependent on individual characteristics. It is inappropriate here 
because different book seekers face different choice sets and the decision is dependent on 
the attributes of choices. Therefore, conditional logit model is used to estimate the 
marginal effect of each attribute of choices given an individual's specific choice sets.  
I restrict the estimate to be on transactions wherein at least one of the potential 
book owners has a received a book from the book requester in the past. I then run the 
estimation for each cluster separately to examine how t e book requester deliberately 
chooses which strategy for the transaction. The results are shown in Table 3.8. 
In all three clusters, users are more likely to choose the book owner who resides 
in the same country to save his/her mailing cost. For users in the indirect reciprocity 
cluster, both the coefficients of if_immediate and if_delayed are not significant. This 
indicates that these users do not purposefully utilize mmediate reciprocity or delayed 
reciprocity even though they could. Rather, book requesters choose book owners based 
on their overall performance in past transactions: book owners who reject others’ requests 
more are less likely to be chosen; book owners who have received more special thanks 
are more likely to be chosen; book owners who have a higher feedback score are more 
likely to be chosen; book owners who request more boks than they give out books are 
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less likely to be chosen. For users in the immediat reciprocity cluster, the coefficient of 
if_immediate is significant whereas the coefficient of if_delayed is not significant. This 
indicates that users in this cluster do intentionally choose partners to whom they have 
given a book in the past 7 days. Interestingly, most of the variables related to the book 
giver’s past performance measures become insignifica t. This strengthens the finding that 
users in the immediate reciprocity clusters do careabout immediate reciprocation very 
much.  For users in the delayed reciprocity cluster, the coefficient of if_delayed is 
significant whereas the coefficient of if_immediate is insignificant. This indicates that in 
contrast to users in the immediate reciprocity cluster, users in the delayed reciprocity 
cluster are not looking for immediate reciprocation. Rather, they patiently wait until they 
find a book they really want in the reciprocal partne ’s inventory list.   
Overall, the analyses results suggest that individuals who are identified as 
belonging to different search strategy clusters do intentionally choose transaction partners 
in ways that are consistent with their pre-defined s arch strategy. 
3.4.4 The Segmentation of Individuals 
 
Given that individuals who use different search strategies intentionally derive differential 
benefits, I next examine how these users segments ca  be identified through main user 
characteristics. A post hoc analysis of whether the usage of different search strategies is 
associated with significantly different user characteristics is conducted. To accomplish 
this, I use the following generalized linear model to test the effects of belonging to 
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The results in Table 3.9 show that individuals who use different search strategies 
significantly differ from each other in user characteristics. I find that users who use the 
immediate or delayed reciprocity search strategy disclose more personal information to 
other users.  Compared to users of the indirect recipro ity strategy who adopt the 
transactional view of the interaction, the other two groups of users have the inclination to 
build relationships in the market and therefore are more willing to provide information to 
promote trust from others (Olson and Olson 2000). In addition, users of the delayed 
reciprocity strategy tend to be significantly more avid and have a much broader interest 
than the other two groups.  
I also examine how these users segments can be identified through their 
psychographic profiles. A targeted survey was designed and emailed to 300 randomly 
chosen users of the barter market (100 users in each strategy group) and 67 full responses 
were received. In the survey, users answered questions about their age, gender, education 
level, annual household income, and other psychographic characteristics including 
altruistic orientation, exchange orientation, long-term relationship orientation, disposition 
to trust and online self-disclosure. All the measure  for the psychographic constructs 
were adapted from previous literature, as listed in Table 3.10. Another general survey 
with the same questions, which also asked respondents to voluntarily disclose their user 
names, was advertised in the marketplace with the help of the market owner. This helped 
elicit 445 more responses. I restrict the analysis to be on 205 users who belong to the pre-
specified strategy groups and who completed all the questions except for the question 
about annual household income in the survey.  
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As shown in Table 3.10, all the Cronbach’s alpha values are above the 
recommended threshold of 0.70, suggesting good reliability for all construct scales 
(Fornell and Larker 1987). One way to evaluate the convergent and discriminant validity 
of each construct is to examine the factor loadings of each indicator. Each indicator 
should have higher loadings on the construct of interest than on any other construct (Chin 
1998). Table 3.11 shows the factors loadings and cross-loadings for all the constructs. An 
inspection of this table suggests that the measurement odel of all constructs provides 
adequate discriminant and convergent validity. 
I then test the effects of belonging to different search strategy groups on the 
means of the joint distribution of all psychographic characteristics as well as 
demographic profiles using the following generalized linear model: 
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The results of the above model are shown in Table 3.12. Except for that users who 
mainly use the delayed reciprocity strategy are a little bit older in age, there are no other 
significant differences in demographic profiles among the three groups of users. 
However, users who belong to different search strategy clusters differ significantly in 
their psychographic profiles. In particular, I find that users who use the delayed 
reciprocity search strategy have a higher disposition to trust others, are more forward-
looking. Users who use the immediate reciprocity strategy tend to trust others less, and 
are inclined to ensure equality by reciprocation in the short-term. Users who belong to the 
indirect reciprocity cluster care about equality less. Interestingly, all three groups of users 
are equally comfortable with sharing personal information online. However as shown 
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earlier, users who use the delayed reciprocity strategy disclose more personal 
information. One possible explanation is that these users are more willing to put efforts to 
disclose themselves as an investment in the market since they are more forward-looking 
and try to build long-term relationships with others in the market. 
Overall, my results suggest that user differences in information search behavior 
are more driven by differences in their psychographic rofiles and transaction needs than 
in their demographic profiles. 
3.5 Discussion 
 
The developments in Internet and Web 2.0 technologies have brought about significant 
transformation in how business transactions are conducted as well as in the day-to-day 
lives of individuals. The emergence of P2P bartering serves as one vivid example that 
highlights such transformation. This study is one of the very first attempts to examine this 
emerging market. I find that participants in P2P barter markets use three different search 
strategies to initiate transactions. More interestingly, I find that the three different search 
strategies lead to differential transaction outcomes. Whereas the indirect reciprocity 
strategy is the predominant form of search in the market, the usage of immediate 
reciprocity strategy improves delivery speed of the current transaction and the usage of 
delayed reciprocity strategy benefits future transactions by ensuring better wishlist 
fulfillment. Furthermore, I demonstrate that the usage of different search strategies is 
associated with different transaction needs and psychographic profiles.  
The findings of this study make significant contributions to the broad literature on 
buyer-seller relationships. Existing research on buyer-seller relationships argues that the 
65 
 
transactions between a buyer and a seller should not be just treated as discrete events. 
Instead, transactions are relational exchanges that reflect the ongoing relationships 
between buyers and sellers (e..g, Dwyer et al. 1987; Ganesan 1994; Wilson 1995). 
Whereas most of the existing studies focus on relation l exchange between buyers and 
sellers in the presence of availability of hard contracts in offline contexts, this study 
examines the relational exchange between market partici nts in barter markets wherein 
no formal contracts are available. Some of the existing research has examined buyer-
seller relationships in online contexts. For example, Pavlou and Gefen (2005) study the 
relationship between buyer and sellers on eBay through the transactional view. In this 
study, I examine the relationship between users in barter markets using the relational 
view. The findings of the study suggest that the lens of relational exchange also applies to 
transactions in online markets even without the presence of formal contracts. In addition, 
this study contributes to the existing literature by showing that individuals with different 
characteristics adopt different views of exchange relationships.  
The study also contributes to the literature on recipro ity. Whereas many studies 
have examined direct reciprocity and indirect reciprocity separately in experimental 
settings or offline field settings (e.g., Berg et al. 1995; Engelmann and Fischbacher 2009; 
Fehr et al. 1998; Nowak and Sigmund 2005), this study is among the first to empirically 
examine how indirect reciprocity and direct reciprocity might coexist and be utilized by 
individuals differently in large online settings. The findings of the study imply that 
certain individuals with certain characteristics value and pursue for direct reciprocity 
even when indirect reciprocity is designed to be the predominant form of exchange. 
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Whereas the study complements the existing literature on bartering by examining 
the microeconomics of bartering between individuals, it also adds to the literature on 
information asymmetry in online marketplaces. Like traditional online marketplaces, P2P 
barter marketplace suffers from the issue of information asymmetry: trading partners are 
not familiar with each other and there is no guarantee that one party will sacrifice his/her 
good to help the other party. The essay provides some new evidence that individuals rely 
on reciprocity to mitigate the “lemons” problem proosed by Akerlof (1970). 
The study provides important implications for the dsign of P2P barter 
marketplaces. For example, the observed reliance of individuals on reciprocity to select 
partners and make transaction decisions indicates that i  is crucial to increase the 
visibility of reciprocal relations. Exemplary measures to achieve this might include 
tracking, recording and publicly displaying every participant’s past interactions. The 
findings that individuals of different search strategies can be segmented based on their 
transaction needs and psychographic profiles suggest that any new design features might 
only be valuable to certain users in the market. The market maker need to carefully 
evaluate which group of users might be embracing a new design feature before 
implementing it. 
I acknowledge several limitations in this study. First, the current analyses mainly 
focus on dyads. Future research could examine the different transaction network patterns 
using social network analysis techniques to help unveil new search and transaction 
strategies. Second, I do not examine how the relationship between two individuals 
changes over time. Future research on the evolution patterns of relationships could help 
better understand the formation and maintenance of ongoing relationships in the markets. 
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Third, a field experiment in the barter marketplace to examine how individuals in 





Chapter 4: Conclusion 
 
The rapid growth of Internet and Web 2.0 technologies has significantly changed the way 
individuals interact with each other in today’s digital economy. The norm of reciprocity, 
which is embedded in all human offline interactions, al o plays an important role in the 
online context. Seeking to understand the impact of reciprocity on individual behavior 
and transaction outcomes in online markets, my dissertation will make significant 
contribution to both theory and practice. 
On the theoretical side, the first essay in my dissertation is among the first to 
examine the implications of feedback-revoking behavior enabled by negative reciprocity 
in online markets. The findings make significant contributions to the literature of online 
reputation system design (ex: Dellarocas 2005; Fan,T  and Whinston 2005; Qu, Zhang 
and Li 2008; Zhou, Dresner, and Windle 2008). A reputation system should facilitate 
market transactions by separating good players (either seller or buyer) from bad ones and 
inducing honest behavior. This essay provides one of the first empirical evidence that 
sellers do respond to the design of the reputation system. Allowing revoking in feedback 
mechanism will lead to sellers’ strategic gaming behavior. After revoking is disabled, the 
more opportunistic sellers increase their efforts to behave better. The findings also 
provide empirical evidence for a fundamental assumption in the theory work of 
reputation system: whether sellers should be modeled as intrinsically bad or not. This 
second essay is also related to the growing literature of gaming behavior in online 
marketplace. Kauffman and Wood (2005) study the shilling behavior of sellers to 
artificially raise bidding prices. Cabral and Hortacsu (2004) find that about one third of 
sellers build up their reputations by being a buyer first. Jin and Kato (2006) find that 
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some eBay sellers make non-credible claims of quality nd mislead buyers. I contribute 
to the above literature by introducing a new way of studying seller’s strategic behavior—
negative reciprocity-enabled revoking. The work is also related to how consumers should 
interpret sellers’ reputation. Zhang (2006) finds that reputation as seller and buyer has 
different impact on closing price. My findings suggest that consumers should take into 
account the negative reciprocation behavior to better differentiate seller quality. 
My second essay is among the first to systematically examine an emerging trading 
model--online P2P barter markets. Whereas many studies have examined direct 
reciprocity and indirect reciprocity separately in explaining cooperative behavior among 
humans (e.g., Berg et al. 1995; Engelmann and Fischbacher 2009; Fehr et al. 1998; 
Nowak and Sigmund 2005), this study is among the first to empirically examine how 
indirect reciprocity and direct reciprocity might coexist and be utilized by individuals 
differently. It also complements the existing literature on bartering by examining the 
microeconomics of bartering between individuals. In addition, this essay also adds to the 
literature on information asymmetry in online marketplaces. Like traditional online 
marketplaces, P2P barter marketplace suffers from the issue of information asymmetry: 
trading partners are not familiar with each other and there is no guarantee that one party 
will sacrifice his/her good to help the other party. The essay provides some new evidence 
that individuals rely on reciprocity to mitigate the “lemons” problem proposed by Akerlof 
(1970). 
On the theoretical side, the first essay in my dissertation is among the first to 
examine the implications of feedback-revoking behavior enabled by negative reciprocity 
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in online markets. The findings make significant contributions to the literature of online 
reputation system design as it provides one of the irst empirical evidence that sellers do 
respond to the design of the reputation system. The findings that strategic sellers improve 
their efforts after negative reciprocity is disallowed also provide empirical evidence for a 
fundamental assumption in the theory work of reputation system: whether sellers should 
be modeled as intrinsically bad or not.  
The finding of sellers’ strategic revoking behavior in the first essay suggests that 
the reputation system should reveal more quality information to buyers when negative 
reciprocity is allowed. Second, the finding that seller behavior is a mixture of both moral 
hazard and adverse selection suggests that online market makers should carefully 
estimate the magnitude of each and strive for a balance between sanctioning (i.e., 
promoting truthful behavior) and signaling (i.e., driving out low-quality sellers) through 
the design of their reputation systems. 
The second essay is among the first to systematically examine an emerging 
trading model--online P2P barter markets. Whereas mny studies have examined direct 
reciprocity and indirect reciprocity separately in explaining cooperative behavior among 
humans (e.g., Berg et al. 1995; Engelmann and Fischbacher 2009; Fehr et al. 1998; 
Nowak and Sigmund 2005), this study is among the first to empirically examine how 
indirect reciprocity and direct reciprocity might coexist and be utilized by individuals 
differently. It also complements the existing literature on buyer-seller relationships by 
validating the relational view of exchange in online markets when formal contracts are 
not available.  
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As for practitioners, this essay provides important implications for the design of 
online markets. For example, given that only avid users use delayed reciprocity a lot, 
market makers with a financial constraint might need to carefully evaluate the percentage 
of these users and their contributions to the overall transaction volume before introducing 
new features such as social networking support that only appeal to them. 
Overall, the findings from my dissertation suggest that reciprocity plays an 
important role in shaping user behavior in online markets. It could have positive or 
negative impact on the efficiency of the market depending on its nature (i.e., whether it is 
positive or negative). . It is shown from my first essay that negative reciprocity, albeit 
harmful to the traditional online market, is partly driven by the seller’ lack of effort. 
Online markets should implement policies that incentivize sellers to exert more efforts, 
such as rewarding high quality sellers with considerable discounts and priorities in the 
search results, among others. One major obstacle to the sustainability of P2P barter 
markets is the “adverse selection” problem: everyone might have the incentive to shed 
from his/her responsibility to help others after he/s  has got a book from others. The 
findings from my second essay suggest that positive reciprocity helps mitigates this 
problem. For an individual to ensure higher transaction quality for both the current and 
the future, he/she might need to use reciprocity as an incentive tool. Therefore, policies 
that help facilitate the norm of positive reciprocity, such as requiring participants to 
maintain a minimal give-to-receive ratio and encouraging participants to establish 
friendships in the markets, among others, will be beneficial to the governance of online 
barter markets. To conclude, online markets should carefully evaluate the influence of 
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reciprocity and make optimal structures, designs and policies to promote transactions and 
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Table 2.1 Pre-Change Revoked Feedback Profile Comparison 
 SRR BRR NRR  Revoked=SRR+BRR+NRR 
Strikers 0.445% 0.028% 0.021% 0.49% 
General 
Sellers  
0.058% 0.015% 0.043% 0.12% 
(Forum 
Sellers) 










Numbers for forum sellers in parentheses,  *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
 
 




Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
(1) log(Number of Listings) 5568 4.00 2.15 0.00 9.19 
(2) Powerseller Status (Dummy) 5568 0.43 0.50 0.00 1.00 
(3) Number of months on eBay 5567 76.77 30.58 5.73 145.83 
(4) Fee Difference ($) 5568 -21.38 89.66 -699.02 1715.68 
(5) log(Reputation Score) 5568 4.46 1.19 0.00 9.61 
(6) Total Negative%  5568 0.27% 0.10% 0.00% 28.57% 
(7) Remained Negative% 5568 0.26% 0.96% 0.00% 25.00% 
(8) Revoked Negative% 5568 0.14% 0.61% 0.00% 25.00% 
(9) SRR% 5568 0.08% 0.39% 0.00% 10.00% 
(10) BRR% 5568 0.02% 0.20% 0.00% 6.67% 
(11) NRR% 5568 0.04% 0.42% 0.00% 25.00% 
(12) Strike (Dummy) 5568 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 





Table 2.3 Correlation Matrix 
Variable VIF (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1)  1.39 1            
(2)   1.29 0.36* 1           
(3)  1.04 0.02* -0.07* 1          
(4)  1.16 -0.28* -0.16* 0.07* 1         
(5)  1.59 0.45* 0.45* -0.18* -0.19* 1        
(6)  1.01 0.01* 0.04* -0.05* -0.01 0.00 1       
(7)  1.01 0.03* 0.01 -0.03* -0.00 -0.02 0.86* 1.00      
(8)  1.01 0.06* 0.06* -0.04* -0.02 0.04* 0.58* 0.07* 1.00     
(9)  1.01 -0.02 0.05* -0.03* -0.03* 0.08* 0.38* 0.07* 0.63* 1.00    
(10)  1.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.19* 0.02 0.33* -0.00 1.00   
(11) 1.00 0.01 0.03* -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.38* 0.03* 0.69* 0.00 -0.00 1.00  
(12)   0.03* -0.02 0.05* 0.04* -0.04* 0.07* -0.01 0.16* 0.27* 0.01 -0.01 1.00 




Table 2.4 Logit Regression Analyses of Strike Propensity 
 Dependent Variable: Strike 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 









(0.278)    
-2.607***  
(0.286)   












# of Months on eBay 0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.007*** 
(0.002)    
0.007*** 
(0.002)    












Total Negative% 13.958*** 
(3.029) 
   




Revoked Feedback%  69.149*** 
(7.098) 
  
SRR%   166.126*** 
(11.073) 
BRR %   15.029 
(19.976) 
NRR %   -52.169 
(33.837) 
Pseudo  R2 0.017 0.045 0.098 






Table 2.5 Pre-Change Overall Reputation Profile Comparison: Revokers vs. Non-
Revokers 




Score Positive Negative Positive Negative Neutral Revoked 
eBay-
Withdrawn 
Revokers 844.24 99.42% 0.58% 97.29% 0.57% 1.12% 0.92% 0.10% 
Non-
Revokers  
754.24 99.56% 0.44% 98.90% 0.41% 0.54% 0.06% 0.09% 
T-value 0.72 -1.63 1.63 -8.36*** 2.62* 5.80*** 10.72*** 0.72 




Table 2.6 Buyers of Revokers vs. Buyers of Non-Revok rs 





























190.80 49.98 1.32% 192.14 50.20 1.70% 
T-test -0.44 -0.45 0.26 -0.38 -0.20 -0.14 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
 
 
                                                        
12 eBay displays the percentage of positive feedback as the key metric of a seller’s reputation. Percentage of 
negative feedback is simply 1 minus the percentage of positive feedback. To be consistent with eBay’s 
practice, I only report the percentage of positive feedback and the percentage of negative feedback for 




Table 2.7 The Impacts of Removal of Revoking: Revokers vs. Non-Revokers 










































































Pt*G i -0.187* 
(0.084) 
-0.205*   
(0.101) 






















































































# of obs. 456792 456792 456792 97330(a) 97330(a) 2376(b) 
+p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
Note: m_Sept08 is dropped from the model due to collinearity with Pt; (a) 359462 feedback instances are removed from 
the regression because of missing data on duration nd price, either due to non-US transactions or missing transaction ID 






Table 2.8 The Impacts of Removal of Revoking: Retalia ors vs. Non-Retaliators 















































































Pt*G i -0.220** 
(0.084) 
-0.243*   
(0.121) 






















































































# of obs. 499589 499589 499589 112250(a) 112250(a) 3060(b) 
+p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
Note: m_Sept08 is dropped from the model due to collinearity with Pt; (a) 387339 feedback instances 
are removed from the regression because of missing data on duration and price, either due to non-US 
transactions or missing transaction ID in the feedback history data; (b) The total number of data points 






Table 2.9   Pre-Change Overall Reputation Profile Comparison: Honest Revokers vs. 
Non-Revokers 









447.52 99.47% 0.53% 96.31% 0.51% 0.88% 1.25% 1.05% 
Non-
Revokers  
453.09 99.73% 0.27% 99.11% 0.27% 0.54% 0.00% 0.08% 
T-value 0.05 -1.77+ 1.77+ -2.25* 1.71+ 2.38* 3.91*** 1.06 






Table 2.10 Falsification Test and Robustness Test 




 (Fixed  
Effects 
 Logit) 















































Gi   -1.032*** 
(0.094) 
 
Pt*G i   0.169*** 
(0.045) 


















































# of obs. 131419 131419 499589 499589 
+p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 














Figure 2.2 Comparison: Change in Negative Feedback Percentage 
 
 






















Appendices for Essay 2 
 
Table 3.1 The Caliński and Harabasz Index for Clustering 











  Table 3.2 The 3-Cluster Solution 
 Indirect_Pct Immediate_Pct Delayed_Pct 
Cluster 1 99.06% 0.26% 0.69% 
Cluster 2  19.98% 60.67% 19.35% 
Cluster 3 20.06% 19.75% 60.19% 
 
 









Indirect Reciprocity Cluster 9156 30.88 79.83% 
Immediate Reciprocity Cluster  317 47.54 4.26% 






Table 3.4 Summary Statistics 
Variable Description N Mean SD Min Max 
(1) Immediate_dummy if  immediate reciprocity cluster 10081 0.03 0.17 0 1 
(2) Delayed_dummy if delayed reciprocity cluster 10081 0.06 0.24 0 1 
(3) if_bio if provides bio 10081 0.24 0.43 0 1 
(4) if_photo if provides photo of self 10081 0.16 0.37 0 1 
(5) if_homepage if provides linkage to personal 
website 
10081 0.10 0.29 0 1 
(6) if_librarything if indicated as a librarything user 10081 0.12 0.32 0 1 
(7) tenure_in_month How long in the market in 
month 
10081 22.26 14.05 0.07 51.03 
(8) interest_breadth(a) Number of genres the individual 
is interested in  
10030 16.19 9.37 1 34 
(9) avidness Number of books requested per 
month 
10081 1.54 2.24 0 48.61 
(10) books_in_category Number of books in inventory 
list 
10006 21.70 27.32 1 632 
(11) log(feedback_score) logarithmized feedback score 10081 3.32 0.85 0 6.62 
(12) log(rejected) logarithmized rejections to 
others’ requests 
10081 0.59 0.72 0 4.62 
(13) log(praise_received) logarithmized special thanks 
from others 
10081 0.24 0.49 0 3.82 
(14) log(praise_given) logarithmized special thanks 
given to others 
10081 0.11 0.40 0 4.33 
(15) receive_give_ratio Number of books received per 
books given 
10063 0.75 0.45 0 9 
(16) rejection_rate Percentage of rejected requests 
from others 
10081 0.07 0.19 0 1 
(17) delivery_speed Intervals between request date 
and mail date 
9691 8.71 14.75 0 571.66 
(18) wishlist_rate Percentage of books requested 
that belongs to wishlist 
10081 0.16 0.29 0 1 
Note: (a): it is calculated based on an individual’s inventory list and wishlist. The maximum number of 




Table 3.5 Correlation Matrix 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
(1)  1.00                  
(2)   -0.05 1.00                 
(3)  0.07 0.07 1.00                
(4)  0.06 0.08 0.37 1.00               
(5)  0.05 0.05 0.33 0.29 1.00              
(6)  0.03 0.06 0.20 0.20 0.20 1.00             
(7)  0.06 0.12 0.05 0.10 0.10 0.16 1.00            
(8)  0.04 0.21 0.14 0.12 0.07 0.10 0.12 1.00           
(9)  0.06 0.32 0.16 0.12 0.03 0.06 -0.15 0.35 1.00          
(10)  0.05 0.44 0.13 0.13 0.05 0.11 0.25 0.48 0.53 1.00         
(11) 0.10 0.35 0.19 0.17 0.09 0.16 0.48 0.52 0.41 0.68 1.00        
(12)  0.03 0.19 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.29 0.29 0.17 0.46 0.43 1.00       
(13) 0.04 0.25 0.17 0.17 0.09 0.11 0.14 0.26 0.36 0.41 0.37 0.19 1.00      
(14) 0.04 0.21 0.18 0.19 0.08 0.14 0.12 0.22 0.24 0.36 0.32 0.15 0.38 1.00     
(15) 0.05 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.08 0.08 0.21 0.13 0.36 0.16 0.13 0.11 0.25 0.11 1.00    
(16) -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 1.00   
(17) -0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 1.00  
(18) 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.05 -0.02 -0.11 -0.06 1.00 




Table 3.6 The Impacts of Search Strategy on Transaction Outcomes: Individual-Level  
 
Dependent Variables: SURE Estimation 
Variables 
Rejection_rate Delivery_speed Wishlist_rate 
 
Coefficient (std. err.) Coefficient (std. err.) Coefficient (std. err.) 
Intercept 0.091*** (0.011) 5.387*** (0.225) -2.230*** (0.125) 
Search Strategy 
Immediate_dummy -0.003 (0.010) -2.551*** (0.347) -0.174*** (0.015) 
Delayed_dummy -0.004 (0.008) -0.808* (0.358) 0.027 (0.082) 
Individual Controls 
if_bio -0.002 (0.005) 0.353 (0.479) 0.050 (0.054) 
if_homepage -0.010 (0.007) -0.308 (0.461) 0.084 (0.075) 
if_photo 0.006 (0.006) 0.237 (0.461) -0.094 (0.062) 
if_librarything -0.004(0.006) 0.010 (0.503) 0.278 (0.265) 
tenure_in_month 0.000 (0.000) 0.008 (0.013) -0.001 (0.002) 
interest_breadth 0.000 (0.000) 0.030 (0.020) 0.008** (0.003) 
avidness 0.023 (0.010) -0.038 (0.054) 0.023* (0.010) 
books_in_inventory -0.000 (0.000) 0.002 (0.006) -0.001 (0.001) 
log(feedback_score) -0.006 (0.004) -1.048*** (0.247) 0.169 (0.142) 
log(rejected) 0.004 (0.003) 0.304 (0.247) 0.041 (0.033) 
log(praise_received) 0.004 (0.004) 0.301 (0.388) -0.034 (0.048) 
log(praise_given) 0.001 (0.005) -0.352 (0.261) 0.127 (0.151) 
receive_give_ratio -0.004 (0.010) 0.193 (0.283) -0.244 (0.254) 
N(LISTWISE) = 9989, System-Weighted R2=0.725 





Table 3.7 The Impacts of Search Strategy on Transaction Outcomes: Transaction-Level 
 
Dependent Variables  
 
Heckman Two-Stage Model  
Variables 
if_reject Delivery_speed if_wishlist 
 
Coefficient (std. err.) Coefficient (std. err.) Coefficient (std. err.) 
Intercept  10.769*** (0.374)  
Search Strategy 
if_immediate -0.742 (0.539) -2.700*** (0.294) -0.726*** (0.101) 
if_delayed -0.141 (0.183) -0.585*** (0.123) -0.156 (0.136) 
Receiver Controls 
r_if_bio 0.119 (0.105) -0.072 (0.067) - 
r_if_homepage 0.074 (0.049) 0.075 (0.095) - 
r_if_photo -0.039 (0.037) 0.020 (0.070) - 
r_if_librarything -0.083(0.050) 0.147 (0.075) - 
log(r_feedback_score) -0.051* (0.023) -0.113* (0.046) -3.235 (3.116) 
log(r_rejected) 0.066*** (0.017) 0.038 (0.033) -0.276 (0.184) 
log(r_praise_received) 0.004 (0.020) 0.139 (0.138) 0.106 (0.157) 
log(r_praise_given) -0.007 (0.017) 0.032 (0.031) 0.247 (0.251) 
r_receive_give_ratio 0.000 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -1.385 (0.127) 
Book Characteristics 
log(price) 0.280*** (0.026) -0.022 (0.056) -0.145*** (0.016) 
log(d_s_ratio) 0.025 (0.026) -0.331*** (0.048) 1.326*** (0.014) 
num_choices 0.001* (0.000)   
Receiver-Giver Similarity 
taste_similarity -0.167 (0.113) -0.155 (0.214) 0.151* (0.071) 
shared_genre 0.003 (0.003) -0.001 (0.006) 0.004** (0.001) 
log(r_focalgenre_depth) -0.012 (0.013) -0.068 (0.065) 0.055 (0.085) 
Instrument Variables & Other Variables:  
if_same_country -0.737*** (0.053)   
selection_bias  3.778* (1.693)  
# of Observations 69560 147148 106110 
Chi Square 386.60 205.17 13144.98 







Table 3.8 Search Strategy and Transaction Partner Choice: Transaction-Level 
 
Dependent Variable: if_chosen  






Variables Coefficient (std. err.) Coefficient (std. err.) Coefficient (std. err.) 
Search Strategy 
if_immediate 0.482 (0.846) 3.653** (1.262) 2.044 (1.423) 
if_delayed -1.274 (1.137) 0.275 (0.288) 0.513*** (0.066) 
Giver Controls 
g_if_bio 0.124* (0.047) 0.376* (0.176) 0.082 (0.058) 
g_if_homepage 0.063 (0.074) -0.269 (0.292) -0.139 (0.094) 
g_if_photo 0.036 (0.051) 0.210 (0.190) 0.296*** (0.060) 
g_if_librarything -0.109 (0.055) -0.592 (0.437) -0.289 (0.171) 
log(g_feedback_score) 0.125* (0.048) -0.052 (0.187) -0.047 (0.057) 
log(g_rejected) -0.191*** (0.022) -0.087 (0.083) -0.195*** (0.026) 
log(g_praise_received) 0.138*** (0.032) 0.050 (0.118) 0.192*** (0.036) 
log(g_praise_given) -0.073 (0.054) 0.045 (0.088) -0.032(0.025) 
g_receive_give_ratio -0.436*** (0.043) -0.498*** (0.164) -0.532*** (0.056) 
Receiver-Giver Similarity 
taste_similarity 0.063 (0.165) 0.486 (0.630) 0.276 (0.212) 
shared_genre 0.035 (0.045) 0.040* (0.016) 0.032*** (0.005) 
log(r_focalgenre_depth) -0.042 (0.030) -0.059 (0.116) 0.041 (0.033) 
Other Variables: 
if_same_country 2.147*** (0.126) 3.280*** (0.913) 2.211*** (0.173) 
position -0.003 (0.003) -0.002 (0.002) -0.005 (0.003) 
g_tenure_in_month -0.006*** (0.000) -0.011*** (0.003) -0.006*** (0.001) 
g_last_login_month -0.002*** (0.000) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001*** (0.000) 
# of Observations 210699 11474 62994 
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.07 0.09 




Table 3.9 User Characteristics and Search Strategy 
 Mean of Dependent Variables: Multivariate Regression Analysis   
Dependent Variable if_bio if_homepage if_photo if_librarything tenure interest_breadth avidness 
Delayed_dummy 
(1) 
0.400 0.179 0.284 0.194 21.52 23.90 4.38 
Immediate_dummy 
(2) 
0.355 0.147 0.276 0.173 21.22 18.12 2.24 
Indirect_dummy 
(3) 


















(3;1,2) (3;1,2) (3;1,2) (3;1,2) n.s. (1;2,3) (1;2,3) 
Overall effect: Wilks’ Lambda = 0.8442, F = 126.49, p = 0.000  
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 









Table 3.10 Construct Operationalization (a) 
Altruistic Orientation (adapted from Webb et al. (2000) and Smith 2003) 
Cronbach’s 
α 
Mean (b) S.D. 
ALT1:  People should be willing to help others who are less fortunate.  
0.773 3.97 0.64 ALT2: +Those in need have to learn to take care of themselve  and not depend on others. 
ALT3: Personally assisting people in trouble is very important to me. 
Exchange Orientation (adapted from Vanyperen and Bunk 1991) 
EXO1: When I give something to another person, I generally expect something in return. 
0.715 3.19 0.80 EXO2: +I do not think people should feel obliged to repay others for favors. 
EXO3: I do not bother to keep track of benefits I have given others. 
Long-Term Relationship Orientation (adapted from Ganesan 1994) 
LRO1: I believe that over the long run, a relationship with someone else on the website will be beneficial. 
0.737 3.13 0.63 
LRO2: Maintaining a long-term relationship with someone else on the website is important to me. 
LRO3: I focus on long-term goals in the relationship with someone else on the website. 
LRO4: I am willing to make sacrifices to help another individual on website from time to time. 
Disposition to Trust (adapted from Ridings et al. 2002) 
DOT1 I generally have faith in humanity 
0.700 3.73 0.61 DOT2 I feel that people are generally reliable 
DOT3 I generally trust other people unless they give me reason not to. 
Online Self-Disclosure (adapted from Ledbetter 2009) 
OSD1 I feel like I can sometimes be more personal during Internet conversations. 
0.845 2.87 0.75 
OSD2 It is easier to disclose personal information online. 
OSD3 I feel like I can be more open when I am communicating online. 
OSD4 I feel less shy when I am communicating online. 
OSD5 I feel less embarrassed sharing personal information with another person online. 
+: reverse coded item 
(a): all the items are measured on a 5-point Likert scale. 
(b): an individual’s score on each construct is measured as the average of agreement (five-point scale) with statements for all items 




















ALT1 0.861 -0.136 0.109 0.075 -0.144 
ALT2 0.797 -0.105 0.075 0.017 -0.159 
ALT3 0.834 -0.175 0.221 0.107 -0.169 
EXO1 -0.152 0.734 0.187 -0.059 0.129 
EXO2 -0.160 0.835 0.013 -0.110 0.043 
EXO3 -0.096 0.819 0.268 -0.084 0.142 
LRO1 0.224 0.040 0.772 0.265 0.156 
LRO2 0.054 0.217 0.862 0.211 0.172 
LRO4 0.087 0.203 0.837 0.141 0.156 
LRO4 0.248 -0.039 0.640 0.333 -0.056 
DOT1 0.098 -0.037 0.297 0.829 -0.020 
DOT2 -0.004 -0.162 0.190 0.792 0.104 
DOT3 0.089 -0.072 0.133 0.746 0.064 
OSD1 -0.121 0.087 0.153 0.105 0.870 
OSD2 -0.160 0.032 0.079 0.006 0.661 
OSD3 -0.192 0.107 0.183 0.058 0.874 
OSD4 -0.105 0.110 0.154 0.014 0.786 






Table 3.12 User Demographics, Psychographic Characteristics and Search Strategy 
 Mean of Dependent Variables: Multivariate Regression Analysis   














1.2 3.66 4.97 5.47 4.17 3.46 3.61 3.89 3.00 
Immediate_dummy 
(2) 
1.17 3.24 5.17 5.22 3.83 3.53 2.79 3.58 2.80 
Indirect_dummy 
(3) 




















Scheffe differences(e) n.s. (1;2,3) n.s. n.s. (1;2,3) (3;1,2) (1;2,3) (2;1,3) n.s. 
Overall effect: Wilks’ Lambda = 0.8442, F = 126.49, p = 0.000  
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
 (a): 1=Male; 2=Female; 
 (b): 1 = 18-24; 2 =25-34; 3 =35-44; 4 = 45-54; 5 =5 or above; 
 (c): 1 = 98th grade or less; 2 = some high school but did not graduate; 3 = high school graduate or GED; 4 =some coll ge or 2-year degree; 5 = 4-year 
college graduate; 6 = more than 4-year college degree. 
 (d): 1 = $0 to $24,999; 2 = $25,000 to $49,999; 3 = $50,000 to $74,999; 4 = $75,000 to $99,999; 5 = $100,000 to $124,999; 6 = $125,000 to 
$149,999; 7 = $150,000 to $174,999; 8 = $175,000 to $199,999; 9 = $200,000 and up. 
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